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THE HANDS OF THE STATE: THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE
AND RESIDENTIAL TENANTS’ RIGHTS IN ARKANSAS
Lynn Foster*
“A healthy society depends on fair and balanced laws.”1
Two recent independent reports have revealed that Arkansas’s residential landlord-tenant law is significantly out of balance with that of other
states and, moreover, is arguably unconstitutional in part. How did this
come about, and why is Arkansas so different?
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A lease is both a conveyance of a property interest and a contract. The
tenant receives a leasehold in return for adhering to the lease covenants.
Under common law, all of the parties’ lease covenants (except the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment) were independent.2 This meant that, in theory,
if a tenant breached the covenant to pay rent, a landlord could not terminate
the lease and eject the tenant, but instead had to sue in court to recover rent
as it was due.3 Similarly, if a landlord had covenanted to make repairs and
*
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School of Law approved by Deans Paula J. Casey and Felecia Epps. The author thanks research assistants Zeb Scott, John Ahlen, and Emily Matteson for their assistance with this
article. She also thanks Nikki Killingsworth, Class of 2013, and Property students Josh Adkerson, Caroline Beavers, Sevawn Foster, Bradley Hughes, Richard Hughes, Brandon
McClinton, and JB Smiley, who gathered data. Thanks are particularly due to those who
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1. NON-LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS
REPORT (2012), reprinted in 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 739 (2013) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/
file%20attachments/Landlord-Tenant%20Commission%20Report.pdf (last visited Jul. 23,
2013).
2. See generally 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 39.02(a) (2d Thomas ed. 2004);
Tom G. Guerts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real Estate, 32 REAL
EST. L.J. 356, 356; Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 229 n.6
(1969–70).
3. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.10 (3d ed.
2000); Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2, at 228 n.4. Landlords also used self-help eviction, but
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did not, the tenant could not terminate the lease, but had to continue to pay
rent and instead enforce the repair covenant in court.4
As a result of the unwieldiness of the independent covenants, in the
nineteenth century states enacted “summary eviction” statutes, allowing
landlords to evict tenants who failed to pay rent.5 Essentially these statutes
are an exception to the common-law rule that parties cannot rescind a lease.6
Further, in the twentieth century, states enacted or judicially adopted implied warranties of habitability, allowing residential tenants to withhold rent
and even terminate leases if landlords breached their new, implied duty to
provide and maintain fit and habitable premises.7 Thus, by the end of the
twentieth century, a rough symmetry in landlord-tenant law once again prevailed. Landlords could terminate leases and evict tenants who breached the
most important lease covenant from a landlord’s point of view, and residential tenants who did not have safe and sanitary premises due to a landlord’s
action or inaction could terminate their leases or withhold rent, to pay for
either small repairs or essential services, and remain on the premises.
Arkansas followed the national trend with respect to summary eviction,
enacting its first unlawful detainer statute in 1875.8 In 1901, however, by the
slimmest of majorities in the Senate, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted an additional “criminal eviction” statute9 that remains on the books today
and results in thousands of cases each year in Arkansas.10 No other state has
such a statute; indeed, Arkansas is the only state that criminalizes a tenant’s
failure to pay rent while occupying the premises during the lease term. The

their rights to that remedy were slowly restricted until today it is probable that most jurisdictions do not allow self-help by landlords against residential tenants. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN §
6.80; 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 40.09(b)(1) (2d Thomas ed. 2007).
4. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 39.02(a); Quinn & Phillips, supra
note 2, at 233–34.
5. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2, at 228 n.4. The authors note that most statutes allow
a landlord to terminate a lease for nonpayment even if the lease does not contain a clause
compelling termination if the rent is not paid. Id.; Arkansas’s statute is of this type. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-60-304 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013).
6. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 6.79.
7. See infra notes 217 through 220 for a list of state statutes and cases adopting the
implied warranty of habitability.
8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-301(a) (Repl. 2003). The current unlawful detainer statute
was enacted in 1981. Id.
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2003) (referred to throughout this article as the
“failure to vacate” statute). See infra text accompanying notes 30 through 35 for an account
of the Act’s passage.
10. See infra Appendix A for a table showing a breakdown of the enforcement of the
failure to vacate statute by district court.
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statute, believed by Professor Carol Goforth and others to be unconstitutional,11 is enforced unevenly—and in some places not at all—across the state.
Arkansas further differs from the rest of the states in that it has no implied warranty of habitability. Although there have been repeated attempts
to introduce the warranty, either by arguing for it in court or introducing it in
bill form in the legislature, such attempts have been repeatedly rebuffed by
both the courts and the legislature.
Two unrelated developments occurred in 2012 and 2013 that focused
attention on Arkansas residential landlord-tenant law. The first of these was
the report of the Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of LandlordTenant Law. The Commission was authorized by statute in 2011.12 Its members were appointed by the Governor, legislators, the two Arkansas law
schools, the Arkansas Bar Association, and various pro-landlord entities.13
Its charge was to “study, review, and report on the landlord-tenant laws in
Arkansas and other states.”14 After meeting regularly over an eight-month
period in 2012, the Commission issued its 36-page report at the end of the
year. The report contrasted Arkansas law with that of other states in several
different areas of residential landlord-tenant law and concluded that Arkansas law was significantly out of balance with that of other states.15 Of the
thirteen unanimous recommendations,16 those relevant here were to repeal

11. See generally, Carol R. Goforth, Arkansas Code § 18-16-101: A Challenge to the
Constitutionality and Desirability of Arkansas’ Criminal Eviction Statute, 2003 ARK. L.
NOTES 21 (2003); NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL SKILLS IN SOCIAL
CONTEXT SOCIAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, RENTERS BEWARE: HOSTILE LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN
ARKANSAS (March 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The 2001 amendments to the statute were briefly referenced in Amy J. Dunn, Title 18 Survey of Legislation:
2001 General Assembly, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 549, 553–54 (2002).
12. To Create the Non-Legislative Commission for the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws;
and for Other Purposes, 2011-5 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv. 613 (LexisNexis).
13. The Arkansas Realtors’ Association, Arkansas Bankers’ Association, Landlords’
Association of Arkansas, and Arkansas Affordable Housing Association each appointed one
Commission member. The author was the Vice Chair of the Commission and the drafter of
the report.
14. 2011-5 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv. 613 (LexisNexis), supra note 12.
15. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
16. Interestingly, despite the frank, candid discussions throughout the eight months that
the Commission met, the circulation of every draft to all Commissioners, the unanimous
votes of all Commissioners for every recommendation (proposals garnering less than unanimous agreement were not included as recommendations), and unanimous approval of the
final draft after numerous changes at the request of several Commission members (emails on
file with the author), after the approval and delivery of the final report and unbeknownst to
the rest of the Commissioners, the five Commissioners who represented landlord and banking
groups signed their own two-page letter of “clarification” two weeks later and presented it to
the Governor, Speaker, and President Pro Tem of the Senate (letter on file with the author).
This letter, however, is not a product of the Commission and its deliberations, as the final
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the criminal failure to vacate statute after civil eviction procedures were
reformed, and to enact a statutory implied warranty of habitability.17
The timing of the Commission’s formation and report was too late for
bill drafting prior to the 2013 legislative session. Nevertheless, in March,
four bills (two of which were “shell bills”18) based on the Commission’s
work were introduced.19 None made it out of their respective judiciary
committee, not even reaching the stage of testimony before the committees,
despite widespread media coverage of the Commission Report.20 The second
development was the Human Rights Watch investigation of the failure to
vacate statute. The Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit, nongovernmental,
international human rights organization, sent a researcher to Arkansas in
2012 who visited courts and interviewed landlords, tenants, attorneys, legal
experts, and a judge as part of investigating the failure to vacate statute.21

report is. In fact, it was written without the knowledge of the other five Commission members.
17. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3–5. Other Commission recommendations
were to 1) streamline the unlawful detainer statute and allow landlords to initiate suit in district court; 2) repeal the “civil eviction statute,” ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-701 through 707
and 901 through 913; 3) codify the already-existing law on landlord self-help evictions; 4)
enact a statute prohibiting retaliatory eviction; 5) prohibit unconscionable lease provisions; 6)
enact legislation prohibiting certain provisions in leases that unfairly limit tenants’ rights; 7)
amend statutes concerning landlords’ access to premises; 8) provide remedies to tenants
denied of possession of premises at the beginning of the lease term; 9) review unenacted
sections of the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act for applicability in Arkansas; 10)
allow early termination of leases to endangered victims of domestic violence; and 11) add a
protected category of sexual orientation to Arkansas’s fair housing statute. Id. at 3–6. The
commissioners were evenly divided as to whether to repeal Ark. Code Ann. section 18-16110, which limits tort liability of landlords, and whether to amend the law with respect to
security deposits, and thus made no recommendations as to those topics. Id. at 3–6, 25–26.
18. A shell bill contains “only a portion of the full bill or merely a short description of
the bill.” Typically, it is filed close to the deadline for introducing bills. ARKANSAS BUREAU
OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 8 (2010).
19. House Bill 1740, a shell bill to reform landlord-tenant law and implement the findings of the Commission, was introduced on March 6. Senate Bills 947, 950, and 951 were
introduced on March 11 and March 18. They would have enacted some of the recommendations of the Commission and created a legislative task force to carry on the work of the
Commission and draft legislation.
20. See, e.g., Arkansas Blog, Commission Recommends Changes in Landlord-Tenant
Law, ARK. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives
/2013/01/14/commission-recommends-changes-in-landlord-tenant-law (last visited Jul. 23,
2013); Commission Says Landlord-Tenant Laws “Out of Balance,” THV11 (Jan. 14, 2013)
http://www.thv11.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=243264 (visited Jul. 23, 2013); There
Oughta Be a Law: Renter Rights, KATV, Feb. 22, 2013, updated Mar. 24, 2013,
http://www.katv.com/story/21313099/there-oughta-be-a-law-renter-rights (last visited Jul. 23,
2013).
21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PAY THE RENT OR FACE ARREST: ABUSIVE IMPACTS OF
ARKANSAS’S DRACONIAN EVICTIONS LAW 1 (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites

2013]

THE HANDS OF THE STATE

5

The subsequent report, issued in 2013, criticized the statute for, among other
reasons, 1) criminalizing tenants on the allegations of landlords without any
independent investigation; 2) imposing fines, jail time, and criminal records
on tenants; 3) denying tenants due process; and 4) turning prosecutors and
city attorneys into “personal attorneys” of landlords.22
The report noted that unscrupulous landlords could file false affidavits
with no consequences and use the failure to vacate statute to circumvent
other statutes designed to protect tenants’ rights, such as laws protecting
tenants who are serving in the armed forces.23 The report discussed the uneven enforcement of the statute across the state, ranging from courts that
simply refuse to hear failure to vacate cases, to courts that order tenants to
leave despite no statutory authority to do so, to courts that do not impose the
harshest penalties of the statute, to courts that may jail tenants.24
The report contended that the statute violates the obligations of the
United States under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights25 in several different ways: 1) by interfering with the protection of the
home through the risk of arbitrary eviction, 2) by the denying due process
and abusing of criminal law, 3) by risking arbitrary detention, and 4) by
risking imprisonment through failure to fulfill a contractual obligation.26
These violations are cold comfort to tenants, however, because the United
States Senate’s consent to the Covenant was subject to its declaration that
Articles 1 through 27, which includes the articles argued to be violated by
Arkansas law, were not self-executing.27 In other words, they cannot be
grounds for litigation in United States courts without implementing legislation—which has not been enacted.28
This article will first discuss the history of the failure to vacate statute,
its treatment by commentators and courts, and its current very uneven enforcement across Arkansas. The article concurs with Professor Goforth’s
/default/files/reports/us0113arkansas_reportcover_web.pdf (last visited July 23, 2012) [hereinafter PAY THE RENT].
22. Id. at 1–2.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 3–4.
25. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a multilateral treaty,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, that went into force in 1976. Parties agree to respect individuals’ civil and political rights, including among others the right to
life, freedom from torture and slavery, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, electoral rights, and rights to due process and a fair trial. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976).
26. PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 35–39.
27. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 347–48 (1995).
28. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992).
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verdict of the unconstitutionality of the statute, argues additional grounds on
which it is unconstitutional, and recommends its repeal. It also recommends
amendment of either the unlawful detainer statute or the recently enacted
“civil eviction” statute to improve summary eviction procedures, and recommends approval of district court jurisdiction over such procedures by the
Arkansas Supreme Court.
Next, the article will briefly consider the current state of the implied
warranty of habitability nationwide, review the attempts to introduce it here,
propose a statutory implied warranty for Arkansas, and in the alternative of
legislative adoption, argue for judicial adoption of a warranty by the Supreme Court.
II. THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE—ARKANSAS’S “LOAN OF ITS
HANDS” TO LANDLORDS29
A.

History

The statute that is currently codified as section 18-16-101 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, was enacted in 1901. Its sponsor was Senator Jacob King, from Stone County. The bill was not without controversy. It was
referred out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with a “Do Not Pass” recommendation.30 It passed the Senate by only one vote, 14 to 13,31 although it
passed more comfortably in the House, 48 to 27.32 Governor Jeff Davis
signed the act on April 24. No official legislative history is available, although the Arkansas Gazette printed remarks from the floor debate in the
Senate.33
Senator King (Jacob) spoke in favor of the bill. He said it simply sought
to give relief to landlords who were unable to eject tenants who would
not pay their rent.
Senator Dowdy opposed the bill. He said it was entirely one-sided. In his
judgment, all in favor of the landlord, and amounted to nothing more nor
less than to give the landlord the right to throw his tenant in jail if he

29. “In the present case the state has simply lent her hands to landlords by enacting this
1901 statute.” Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 513, 774 S.W.2d 830, 837 (1989) (Purtle, J.,
dissenting).
30. ARK. S. JOURNAL, 33d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 77 (1901). At that time, legislative procedure differed from that of today, and a “Do Not Pass” recommendation would not
kill a bill.
31. Id. at 181.
32. ARK. H. JOURNAL, 33d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 398 (1901).
33. South Carolina Dispensary Law - Similar Bill Introduced in the House; Thirty-Four
New Bills In, ARK. GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 1901, at 3.
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failed to pay the rent. He was opposed to criminal measures for settling
matters already covered by civil statutes.
Senator Short said the bill sought only to see that justice was done the
landlord. The bill provided that if a tenant failed to carry out a contract,
then the landlord was to give him ten days’ notice to vacate, and if the
tenant continued to hold possession after notice to vacate was served he
would be subject to fine from $1 to $25 and $10 per day for every day so
holding possession thereafter. He did not think the act would work a
hardship upon the tenant, but it would make him do right and act honest.
Senator Dowdy said a case might occur when the tenant actually had a
right to continue on the premises. He might have complied with his contract which, in many cases, were verbal, and the landlord might insist
that he had not so complied, serve notice on him to get out, and if he
failed slap him in jail. If a poor man, to pay his fine and get back his liberty the best way he could.
Senator Lawrence also opposed the bill. He said it was simple class legislation in favor of the landlord, no more, no less, and ought to be defeated.
Senator Jacob King–The bill only provides for a fine and nothing is said
about putting anybody in jail.
Senator Lawrence–That is true, but we all know what is done to a poor
man in this state who cannot pay his fine. He is sent to jail and compelled to work it out.
Senator Kirby also opposed the bill. He thought the county was coming
to a great pass when a man could be arrested and put in jail for debt. He
could not see that the bill amounted to anything else. It gave the landlord
absolute power over his tenant in many instances, and he thought the bill
ought to be defeated.
Senator Jacob King closed the debate. He said that the act was needed in
the country as well as in the towns. It was intended to compel men to
come up to their contracts and prevent dishonesty along that line. He
thought it a good law and he hoped the senate would pass the bill.34

The reference to “working it out” by Senator Lawrence refers to the
practice, endemic throughout the South during this period (and abolished in
Arkansas in 1909), of convict leasing, whereby convicts were “leased” to
private parties who would use them as virtual slaves in agricultural and in-

34. Id.
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dustrial capacities.35 Other than for that abolished practice, the same points
could be argued against the statute today.
Time has effected some changes, however. Today, at least in Pulaski
County, the county that hears the most failure to vacate suits each year, it is
no longer “poor men” who are most harmed by the statute, but black women.36 In 2012, 62% of failure to vacate affidavits filed in the Little Rock
Criminal Court were against tenants who were black women.37 In fact,
women comprised 71% of all defendant tenants in Little Rock, and 57% in
Springdale.38 Also, today, instead of “working it out,” criminal offenders
may be victimized by the imposition of “legal financial obligations” that can
have serious and lasting effects on their functioning in society.39
B.

Other States—A Single Florida Precedent

As noted above, no other state has such a law today. Even examining
state law during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, online
searching has revealed no similar law in other southern states in force during
the time period in which Arkansas enacted the failure to vacate statute.40
Florida enacted a statute in 193341 (later repealed) that criminalized the
act of holding over by a tenant. A holdover is a different act than that criminalized by the Arkansas statute; in a holdover, the tenant remains on the
premises after the natural termination of the lease.42 In 1935, the Florida
Supreme Court rendered the only appellate decision on this statute.43 A Dade
County tenant had held over, and after being arrested, sued for a writ of ha35. Arkansas ended the practice in 1909. Carl H. Moneyhon, Convict Lease System,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS HISTORY & CULTURE , http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net
/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=4153 (last updated Sept. 12, 2012); see generally
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (2008).
36. See infra App. B.
37. See infra Appendix B for more statistics on failure to vacate defendants, affiants,
and property owners. Throughout this article, tenants will be referred to in the female gender,
and landlords in the male gender.
38. Infra App. B.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 134 through 140 for further discussion of negative consequences of LFOs.
40. Available statutory codes were searched on HeinOnline Session Laws (which also
contains selected superseded statutory codes) between 1870 and 1940 for the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri.
41. 1933 Fla. Laws ch. 16066, 422 (repealed by 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-330, 770).
42. “It shall be unlawful to hold possession of lands or houses by any lessee whose lease
has expired . . . . Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than One
Hundred Dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three months . . . .” 1933 Fla. Laws ch.
16066, 422.
43. Coleman v. State ex rel. Carver, 161 So. 89 (Fla. 1935).
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beas corpus, alleging that the statute was unconstitutional.44 The trial court
agreed but failed to cite a specific section of the Florida or United States
Constitution.45
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court, holding the statute constitutional.46 The court acknowledged the legislature’s power to criminalize acts which formerly were merely civil wrongs.47 It noted that the
statute applied only to tenants at sufferance, who had no contractual rights
as their lease terms had already ended.48 The court responded to an argument
that the statute benefitted landlords, rather than the public, by comparing
holding over to trespass, stating that “[a]ll statutes against trespass are primarily for the protection of the individual property owner, but they are also
for the purpose of protecting society against breaches of the peace which
might occur if the owner of the property is required to protect his rights by
force of arms.”49 The reasoning as to the preference of a criminal statute to
self-help would not be persuasive today in Arkansas, because Arkansas prohibits self-help by landlords.50
Justice Brown dissented, agreeing with the trial court that the statute
was unconstitutional.51 He quoted from the trial court’s opinion that the act
required no intent to commit a trespass or any other offense as a prerequisite
for conviction.52 The trial judge believed the “real purpose, intent and effect
of the Act is to assist lessors, at public expense, in regaining possession of
premises under indentures of lease . . . .”53 The judge believed the law broke
the “line of demarcation between civil wrongs or torts, and crimes.”54 The
trial court’s opinion contained a quotation from Blackstone’s Commentaries
that is still relevant to Arkansas today:
[P]rivate wrongs or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the
civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity. As, if I detain a
field from another man, to which the law has given him a right, this is a
civil injury, and not a crime; for here only the right of an individual is
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Coleman, 161 So. at 92.
E.g., Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d 888 (1986).
Coleman, 161 So. at 92 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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concerned, and it is immaterial to the public which of us is in possession
of the land.55

Just as with Arkansas’s Senate’s debate in 1901 over the failure to vacate bill, these arguments against a similar statute are just as cogent today
when applied to Arkansas. Meanwhile, landlord-tenant law nationally has
moved significantly in the direction of increased rights for tenants, causing
Arkansas to lag even further behind. The following section will explain the
current failure to vacate law in Arkansas—what is on the books versus what
actually happens in courts throughout the state.
C.

Current Law and Enforcement

Serving on the Landlord-Tenant Study Commission and hearing Commissioners’ comments about the unequal enforcement of the failure to vacate statute piqued the author’s interest in the enforcement of the failure to
vacate statute across Arkansas. From December 2012 to January 2013, several of the author’s students visited district courts in some of Arkansas’s
most populous cities and towns and asked for statistics on how failure to
vacate cases were handled. This narrow investigation revealed that enforcement was wildly uneven.
In the summer of 2013, the author and her research assistants contacted
each Arkansas district court with several questions: the approximate number
of failure to vacate cases each year, the typical outcome of such cases, and
whether tenants were ever fined, jailed, ordered to pay restitution, or ordered
to leave the premises. The author was able to obtain a year’s worth of failure
to vacate affidavits from both the Springdale District Court and the Little
Rock District Court,56 as well as examine several from a few other district
courts. Additionally, the author met and corresponded with Legal Services
attorneys, the attorneys who most often represent those few tenants who
obtain counsel, to discuss how enforcement of the failure to vacate statute
actually plays out in court. The results of this research confirm extremely
uneven enforcement of the statute statewide, occasionally even within particular counties, and general overall deviation from the text of the statute.
1.

No Enforcement

To begin with, not all district courts hear failure to vacate cases. The
total number of courts called was 233. Of those, sixty-seven courts (29%)
refuse to hear failure to vacate cases.57 In eighteen counties (24%), this is a
55. Id. at 92 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5).
56. Affidavits on file with author.
57. Infra App. A.
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county-wide ban. In ten counties, district courts seem to have reached independent, opposing decisions about whether to hear such cases. A total of
forty district courts do not hear failure to vacate cases because they refer
them to other, typically larger, courts within the same county.58 Eight courts
responded that they heard traffic cases only. The decision not to hear failure
to vacate cases may be made by the judge, the prosecutor, or both.
2.

Some Background Statistics

Using the most conservative number estimates provided, over 2,000
failure to vacate cases are filed in Arkansas each year.59 Per county, the
number of annual cases in those counties that hear such cases ranged from
fewer than one, in eight courts, to almost 500 in Little Rock.60 The courts
hearing the most cases, in descending order, are Little Rock, Texarkana, Hot
Springs, North Little Rock, and Springdale.61
As noted in Appendix B, the statute impacts women (and presumably
children) more so than men, as they are the majority sex prosecuted, both in
Little Rock and in Springdale, but more so in Little Rock (71%) than in
Springdale (57%).62 Only twenty-four of the 396 Little Rock affidavits were
filed against cohabiting tenants who had cosigned their leases; the others
were filed against tenants signing singly.
A tally of landlords using the failure to vacate statute in Little Rock revealed that the 396 affidavits filed during 2012 were filed by individuals
representing only 168 real estate owners. Some have theorized that only
“mom and pop” landlords, those operating on a thin margin and unable to
afford an attorney, are the chief users of the statute, but the addresses of the
tenants and these statistics reveal that many landlords of multiple-unit rental
housing regularly rely on the statute. One LLC filed failure to vacate charges against sixteen tenants during a one-year period. Several filed more than
ten affidavits in the one-year period.
3.

Notice and Arraignment

Section 18-16-101 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, was last amended
in 2001.63 In its current form, the statute first states that a tenant who fails to
58. These were counted as courts that heard failure to vacate cases.
59. See infra Appendix A, containing a conservative estimate, from figures provided, of
approximately 2,150 failure to vacate cases every year.
60. Little Rock heard 475 cases in 2012. Three hundred and ninety-six affidavits were
filed (affidavits on file with author).
61. See infra App. A.
62. Infra App. B.
63. The statute’s current form is as follows:
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pay rent when it is due forfeits all right to occupy the premises.64 Some
states allow for the late payment of rent under some circumstances.65 Arkansas, under the failure to vacate statute, does not. Therefore, once rent has not
been paid, the landlord (or landlord’s agent or attorney) can give written
notice, and if the tenant is still on the premises later than ten days following
the giving of notice, the tenant is “guilty of a misdemeanor”66 and may be
fined $25 per day.67 Prior to the last amendments in 2001, the amount of the

(a) Any person who shall rent any dwelling house or other building or any land
situated in the State of Arkansas and who shall refuse or fail to pay the rent
therefor when due according to contract shall at once forfeit all right to longer
occupy the dwelling house or other building or land.
(b)(1) If, after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given by the landlord or the landlord’s agent or attorney to the tenant to vacate the dwelling house
or other building or land, the tenant shall willfully refuse to vacate and surrender
the possession of the premises to the landlord or the landlord’s agent or attorney,
the tenant shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) Upon conviction before any justice of the peace or other court of competent
jurisdiction in the county where the premises are situated, the tenant shall be
fined twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day for each day that the tenant fails to vacate the premises.
(c)(1) Any tenant charged with refusal to vacate upon notice who enters a plea of
not guilty to the charge of refusal to vacate upon notice and who continues to inhabit the premises after notice to vacate pursuant to subsection (b) of this section
shall be required to deposit into the registry of the court a sum equal to the
amount of rent due on the premises. The rental payments shall continue to be
paid into the registry of the court during the pendency of the proceedings in accordance with the rental agreement between the landlord and the tenant, whether
the agreement is written or oral.
(2)(A) If the tenant is found not guilty of refusal to vacate upon notice, the rental
payments shall be returned to the tenant.
(B) If the tenant is found guilty of refusal to vacate upon notice, the rental payment paid into the registry of the court shall be paid over to the landlord by the
court clerk.
(3) Any tenant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to or is found guilty of refusal to vacate upon notice and has not paid the required rental payments into the
registry of the court shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2003).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(a) (Repl. 2003).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9A-461 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); ALASKA STAT. §
09.45.090 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.660(2) (LexisNexis 2002) (tenant has within
seven days of receiving nonpayment and intent to terminate notice from landlord to pay the
rent). Seven days is a common period, as is three days. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
562A.27(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2013). In fact, in Oregon, a landlord may not even deliver a
notice of nonpayment and intent to terminate until the rent is five days late. OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 90.394(2)(b) (West 2010).
66. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(b)(1) (Repl. 2003).
67. Id. § 18-16-101(b)(2) (Repl. 2003).
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daily fine was discretionary, between $1 and $25 per day.68 The 2001
amendments raised it to a flat $25 per day.
Thus, even if the rent is one day late, by law the tenant has forfeited the
remainder of the leasehold term, no matter how long, and on that day the
landlord can post the notice and begin the failure to vacate procedure. Some
landlords allegedly refuse to accept timely rent payments from tenants so
they can use the failure to vacate statute to evict them.69 In a documented
abuse of the procedure, one landlord crossed out the “10” in the ten-day
notice, wrote in “3,” and proceeded to the arraignment stage.70
If at the end of the ten days the tenant has not vacated, the landlord typically files the ten-day notice and an affidavit (some courts also require a
copy of the lease) with the appropriate authority—the police, sheriff, prosecuting attorney, or city attorney. Some of the courts handling large volumes
of failure to vacate cases have form failure to vacate affidavits, setting out
statutory elements, so that the landlord need only sign. Other, smaller courts
are more likely to use generalized forms. It is questionable as to how many
failure to vacate cases are investigated and not merely “rubber stamped” by
prosecutors or city attorneys before being presented for the judge’s signature
on the warrant or summons.
68. The statute was greatly expanded in 2001. Prior to that year, Ark. Code Ann. section
18-16-101 read as follows:
(a) Any person who shall rent any dwelling house or other building or any land
situated in the State of Arkansas and who shall refuse or fail to pay the rent
therefor when due according to contract shall at once forfeit all right to longer
occupy the dwelling house or other building or land.
(b) If, after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given by the landlord
or his agent or attorney to the tenant to vacate the dwelling house or other building or land, the tenant shall willfully refuse to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises to the landlord or his agent or his attorney, the tenant shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction before any justice of the peace or
other court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the premises are situated, the tenant shall be fined in any sum not less than one dollar ($1.00) nor more
than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each offense. Each day the tenant shall willfully and unnecessarily hold the dwelling house or other building or land after
the expiration of notice to vacate shall constitute a separate offense.
Id. § 18-16-101. The 2001 amendments changed the fine, required the restitutionary payment
of alleged rent due to the court and subsequently the landlord, and made a conviction without
the restitutionary payment a Class B misdemeanor.
69. Interview with Dustin Duke, Managing Attorney, Ctr. for Ark. Legal Services, and
Stacy Fletcher, Staff Attorney, Ctr. for Ark. Legal Services, (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter
Duke & Fletcher Interview]. Their advice to tenants in this situation is to take a witness when
attempting to pay the rent, so that the witness can later testify in court. Id.
70. Id. The judge dismissed the case at the arraignment. Email from Dustin Duke, Managing Attorney, Ctr. for Ark. Legal Services, to Lynn Foster, Ark. Bar Foundation Professor,
UALR William H. Bowen School of Law (Aug. 15, 2013, 00:00 CST) (on file with author).
See also PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 33, for an account of the incident.
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The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does
not permit public housing or Section 8 landlords71 to use the failure to vacate
statute.72 One of the Arkansas district courts hearing the most failure to vacate cases requires the landlord or agent to swear that the landlord is not
receiving any rental assistance from an agency such as HUD on behalf of
the tenant. Affidavits from a few other courts around the state that were examined did not contain such a provision, raising the question of whether
HUD’s directive may freely be ignored without enforcement in some quarters.73
The court handling the largest volume of failure to vacate cases requires a witness both to view the posting of the ten-day notice and to sign
the notice. The affidavit the landlord must file asks for a witness’s name and
signature, yet of hundreds of affidavits from that court examined by the author not a single one was signed by a witness.74 In other courts, on the other
hand, no witness is necessary. One affidavit examined by the author stated
as facts constituting reasonable cause “failure to vacate” and no more.75
Certainly most landlords fill out the affidavits truthfully. However,
there is often no independent check at this stage if a landlord does not. The
Human Rights Watch report documented one case where the “tenant” was
actually a purchaser, but nonetheless, the “landlord” repeatedly filed affidavits, which were repeatedly sent on to law enforcement officials, resulting in
the tenant being required to appear in court.76 In 2013, a similar case arose in
northeast Arkansas in which a seller filed a failure to vacate charge against a
purchaser under a contract for deed.77 A tenant personally observed by the
author in the Little Rock Criminal Court Clerk’s Office stated that she paid
her rent promptly but had reported her landlord to Code Enforcement because her ceiling fell in and damaged her personal property. She alleged that
he was retaliating by posting a ten-day notice. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that a number of rent payment disputes arise over repairs, which is not surprising because Arkansas has no implied warranty of habitability. Landlords
who have not covenanted to do so need not make any repairs, unless the
premises are in such bad condition that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is
breached, in which case a tenant must move out in order to sue, and the only
71. Section 8 landlords are those that rent to tenants who find their own housing and
receive payment assistance by voucher from the federal government. Landlords, HUD.GOV,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/groups/landlords (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 141 through 145 for a discussion of HUD’s directive.
73. Affidavits on file with author.
74. Affidavits on file with author.
75. Affidavits on file with author.
76. PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 3, 25–26.
77. Suit Against Blackman Dropped, JONESBORO SUN, Oct. 22, 2013. The judge dismissed the case.
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remedy is termination of the lease and not repair. A common sequence of
events is that a tenant and a landlord will disagree over repairs, and the landlord will force the tenant out, often using the failure to vacate statute, and
rent to someone else. In at least a few district courts, it seems landlords’
allegations are taken as fact without investigation, much less application of
the presumption that the tenant is innocent of a crime.
On approval of a warrant or summons by a district court judge, tenants
are served by the police or sheriff, and may be arrested if there are other
outstanding warrants. Some courts require tenants to make bond prior to any
arraignment, and tenants may be jailed if they cannot make bond.78 Tenants
must appear for a criminal arraignment.79 Most persons would agree that this
procedure creates more of a stigma for the tenant than notice of a civil lawsuit, even if served by a process server.80 Often, tenants do not understand
the full legal implications of a ten-day notice. Many are frightened and
ashamed when served with a warrant or summons. The mere fact of criminal
prosecution no doubt discourages some innocent tenants and causes them to
leave the premises, rather than face the ordeal of posting bond or appearing
for arraignment, especially if they have already been in the criminal justice
system or are in it during their tenancy.
The “willfulness” requirement of the statute has been interpreted by the
Arkansas Supreme Court as “willfully refusing to remove therefrom with
the necessary criminal intent to deprive the rightful owner of his property.”81
But typically the questions the judge asks the tenant are simply whether the
tenant is on the premises and whether the tenant paid the rent on time.82 And
so the tenant who is late because of a personal crisis or a good-faith misunderstanding with the landlord is just as guilty under the law as one who deliberately does not pay.83 As the dissenting judge in Coleman argued with
respect to the Florida statute, a tenant could remain on the premises because
of the illness of himself or a family member, or because of an “honest mistake.”84

78. See Duke & Fletcher Interview, supra note 69.
79. Arkansas district court have jurisdiction to hear misdemeanors concurrent with circuit courts. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 7. It is conceivable that a circuit court could conduct
the procedure but the author was unable to find any such instances.
80. See PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 22, for the account of a tenant who was served
a criminal summons at her job as a cashier.
81. Polk v. State, 28 Ark. App. 282, 285, 772 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1989) (quoting Poole v.
State, 244 Ark. 1222, 1226, 428 S.W.2d 628, 630 (1968)).
82. See Interview with Alice Lightle, Little Rock Criminal Court Judge (Dec. 5, 2012);
PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 20–21; Duke & Fletcher Interview, supra note 69.
83. PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 2.
84. Coleman v. State ex rel. Carver, 161 So. 89, 93–94 (Fla. 1935) (Brown, J., dissenting).
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Payment of Alleged Rent Due

If a tenant pleads not guilty and remains on the premises, the 2001
amendments to the statute require the tenant to deposit the sum the landlord
alleges is due for rent.85 In other words, in this criminal proceeding, a defendant who pleads not guilty must pay a sum alleged due by a third party,
without any investigation of the veracity of the allegation, prior to any trial.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the tenant must continue to pay
rent “into the registry of the court.”86 The statute does not expressly state
that if the tenant fails to pay there will be no trial, but that is the clear implication—“[a]ny tenant charged with refusal to vacate upon notice who enters
a plea of not guilty to the charge of refusal to vacate upon notice and who
continues to inhabit the premises after notice to vacate pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be required to deposit into the registry of the
court a sum equal to the amount of rent due on the premises.”87
If the tenant pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the tenant is guilty of a
Class B misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $1,000 or ninety days in
jail, unless the tenant pays over to the landlord the amount the landlord stated was due on the affidavit, including any accrued rent.88 Requiring a criminal defendant who pleads “not guilty” to pay a sum into court is unheard of
in criminal law and is tantamount to a presumption that the defendant is
guilty. This is the most egregious feature of the statute.89
Professor Goforth likened this “up front” requirement to pay rent allegedly owed to the bond required when a court sets bail.90 However, as she
noted, this analogy fails because bail is a discretionary amount not imposed
in all circumstances, and only imposed to protect society.91 Additionally, the
court, and not the victim, retains forfeited bail.92 Finally, a criminal defendant does not lose the right to trial through failure to make bail.93 She cites a
85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(c)(1) (Repl. 2003). This seems to be a weird borrowing of the bond required in some states if a tenant, in an eviction proceeding, wishes to stay
on the premises pending a full hearing. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-311 (2010) (tenant
who asks for continuance of more than two days in unlawful detainer proceeding must give
sufficient security); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.12.100 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014) (tenant
to pay bond in order to stay enforcement of writ of restitution); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 799.44
(West 1981) (tenant may be required to pay bond in order to stay enforcement of writ of
restitution).
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(c)(1) (Repl. 2003).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 18-16-101(c)(3).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 146 through 149 for analysis of the constitutionality of this requirement.
90. Goforth, supra note 11, at 28.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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2002 Springdale case in which the tenant defendant was jailed after pleading
not guilty because he could not pay the “bond” of $425.
The potential consequences of this would have been staggering if this
had been a civil proceeding, as we would normally expect both parties to
have equal access to the courts rather than conditioning a defendant’s access to a pre-hearing deposit. In this case, the process was even more
outrageous, as the defendant’s right to defend against a criminal prosecution appears to have been conditioned on his payment into court amounts
that had not at that time been proven to be owing, but were merely
claimed to be due.94

The foregoing scenario described is still possible in several courts
across the state, some of which handle significant numbers of cases. However, most district courts do not follow this provision of the statute. Most
courts (58%) do not ever require tenants to pay back rent, either before or
after sentencing. Court after court stated that if landlords wanted rent, they
must sue in small claims court. A comment repeatedly heard was that the
failure to vacate statute is “just to get tenants out.” The civil unlawful detainer statute addresses these problems of the landlord—both the need to
evict the tenant and the right to back rent. However, many residential landlords simply do not avail themselves of the unlawful detainer statute.95
In some courts, the alleged rent payment and fine operate as a lever to
get tenants out. Tenants are told that if they move out, they will not have to
pay either a fine or the amount the landlord is requesting. The innocent or
good-faith tenant, who may have little money or who may be tired of asking
unsuccessfully for repairs over several months, and who probably is not
represented by an attorney, will move out rather than try to defend herself.
Often in breach of the lease in the first place because of an economic setback, tenants must pay even more for a trial. This aspect of the statute effectively reverses any presumption of innocence; in essence, tenants are presumed guilty.
A feature of the statute more akin to civil than to criminal proceedings
is the ultimate disposition of the payment of alleged rent, which a few courts
do collect. In a typical criminal trial, the fine paid goes to the state. The failure to vacate statute, however, characterizes the payment not as a fine but as
the “sum equal to the amount of rent due.”96 The court does not keep this
sum. If the tenant is found not guilty, the tenant receives it back from the

94. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).
95. See infra text accompanying note 201 for landlords’ objections to the unlawful detainer statute.
96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(c)(1) (Repl. 2003).
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court. Otherwise, the court pays it to the landlord, like damages in an eviction or tort proceeding.97
One can argue that the alleged rent is restitution. Restitution is not an
aspect of classic criminal law sentencing,98 but recent trends in the last several decades have popularized it as a form of “restorative justice.”99 Various
federal and state statutes now authorize restitution in certain contexts. Section 5-4-205 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, authorizes the payment of
restitution by a defendant convicted of an offense. However, under this statute restitution is not mandatory; its imposition rests in the discretion of the
court.100 If restitution is to be ordered for an offense not causing bodily harm
to the victim, the amount of restitution is “a factual question to be decided
by the preponderance of the evidence presented to the sentencing authority
during the sentencing phase of a trial.”101 The failure to vacate statute, however, requires restitution in all cases except where the defendant is found not
guilty.102 Further, failure to deposit the alleged restitutionary amount results
in a step-up in the crime classification, from an unclassified to a Class B
misdemeanor, which raises the possibility of a sentence of a fine up to
$1,000 and imprisonment up to ninety days.103
Section 5-4-205 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, allows a defendant
to pay restitution, if it is ordered, within a period of time, or in specified
installments. The statute lists factors for the court to take into account when
considering whether to allow restitution payment to be delayed: 1) the defendant’s financial resources and the burden restitution will impose; 2) the
ability of the defendant to pay by installment; and 3) the rehabilitative effect
payment will have on the defendant.104 Again, the failure to vacate statute is
not so finely nuanced. The defendant, who has just lost her place of residence, in many cases because she has suffered a drop in income or encountered unexpected expenses of another type, must pay the alleged amount of
rent due or risk jail or a substantial fine, regardless of any of these factors.
The failure to vacate statute seems to contradict section 5-4-205.
Another problem with the requirement of payment of this sum into “the
registry of the court” is that district courts do not have registries. Thus, in a
recent case involving a tenant who pled not guilty, the tenant was unable to
97. Id. at § 18-16-101(c)(2)(B).
98. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3(b) (2d ed. 2003).
99. Id. § 1.5(a)(7).
100. “A defendant who is found guilty or who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
to an offense may be ordered to pay restitution.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(a)(1) (Repl.
2013) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 5-4-205(b)(4)(A).
102. Id. § 18-16-101(c)(2)(A) (Repl. 2003).
103. See id. § 18-16-101(c)(3).
104. Id. § 5-4-205(e)(2).
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pay into the nonexistent registry. Yet nonpayment means a stiffer sentence
and worse offense, so the Legal Services attorneys explained their dilemma
to the prosecutor, who advised them to give him notice of the payments, but
to pay them to the landlord.105
5.

Outcomes

Under the statute, if the tenant is found not guilty, the deposited funds
are returned to the tenant, and the lease term carries on as before. If the tenant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty, the tenant is guilty of
an unclassified misdemeanor,106 with a potential penalty of $25 per day of
violation.107 On the other hand, if the tenant has not paid the alleged rent
due, the classification of the crime is increased to a Class B misdemeanor,
with a sentence of a fine up to $1,000 and imprisonment for ninety days.108
Real-life outcomes in the courts are more varied. Some district courts
do impose the $25 per day fine.109 Others impose a flat fine, regardless of
how many days over the tenant has stayed.110 Some do not impose a fine, as
long as the tenant moves out within a reasonable time.111 As Appendix A
indicates, one notable deviation from the statute is the practice of at least
seven courts to order tenants to leave, even though the statute does not authorize such a power.112
In 2004 the Arkansas Attorney General was asked whether under the
failure to vacate statute a judge could force tenants to leave. The answer was
no.113 Either ejectment or the unlawful detainer statute must be used to force
tenants out, and the legal mechanism is a writ of possession.114 Nonetheless,
research reveals that some district courts do order tenants to leave premises
in failure to vacate arraignments and trials.
Although researchers were told that at least one court threatens tenants
with jail if the tenant does not move out, Appendix A seems to reveal that in
practice, actually jailing tenants for failure to vacate rarely happens. However, a tenant who stays beyond the ten days (and tenants convinced of their
innocence are more likely to stay) risks a fine, depending on the court and
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
2013).

Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-107(c)(2) (Repl. 2013).
Id. § 18-16-101(c)(3) (Repl. 2003).
Id. § 18-16-101(c)(3); id. § 5-4-201; id. § 5-4-401 (Supp. 2010).
See infra App. A.
See infra App. A.
See infra App. A.
See infra App. A.
Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-148 (June 14, 2004).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-208 (Repl. 2003); id. § 18-60-309 (Repl. 2003 & Supp.
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the judge. Tenants who are fined and cannot pay the fine risk jail time, in all
courts. No doubt this is a powerful impetus to force innocent tenants out.
Landlords told Commissioners that most tenants in unlawful detainer
actions simply fail to reply to the complaint, and thus the landlord can simply obtain a writ of possession at the initial hearing stage.115 Landlords may
decide to pursue a judgment as well, for unpaid rent, fees, and costs, and any
damages.116 The landlord then becomes a judgment creditor of the tenant.
The same behavior in a criminal proceeding is far more serious, however. A tenant who does not appear at arraignment will probably be charged
with failure to appear. Courts differed in their practice here as well, with
some courts dismissing charges if the tenant had vacated the premises prior
to the arraignment, and others requiring the tenant to appear even if she had
already moved out. In cases where the tenant is required to appear and does
not, failure to appear is a crime, and typically the judge will issue a bench
warrant. Sooner or later the defendant will be stopped by the police, the failure to appear warrant will appear in the police data base, and the tenant will
be arrested and possibly jailed.
D.

Failure to Vacate Criminalization and Public Policy

An Arkansas landlord whose tenant is in possession of the premises
without paying rent may sue in court under one or more of the civil claims
of unlawful detainer or ejectment. However, many residential landlords in
Arkansas do not file a civil action to remove a tenant. Why should they?
There is little incentive for a landlord to retain an attorney, pay filing fees,
and use a civil statute when for no charge at all he can file an affidavit with
a prosecutor or city attorney, use that prosecutor in lieu of an attorney, avoid
any counterclaims against himself, and much less expensively remove a
tenant from his premises. Does public policy support such a unique and unbalanced approach to landlord tenant law?
Again and again, researchers heard the opinion expressed by court personnel that the failure to vacate statute is the “only way” to remove a tenant
from the premises, and that to obtain back rent landlords “must” sue in small
claims court, as though the unlawful detainer statute simply did not exist. Is
there something special about Arkansas that justifies criminalizing nonpayment of rent while occupying the rental premises, and “lending the government hands” to landlords? To attempt to answer this question it is useful to
examine why certain behavior is made criminal by the government. A crime
is behavior, comprised of contemporaneous intent and act, that 1) causes
harm, 2) is forbidden by statute, and 3) is subject to predictable, statutory
115. Id. § 18-60-307 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013).
116. Id. § 18-60-309 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013).
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punishment.117 The purpose of the criminal law is to prevent harm to the
public.118 Harm to the public, and not to individuals, is the hallmark of a
crime. “[T]he state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the public
interest but not to compensate the victim . . . .”119 Certain acts are crimes,
rather than private wrongs, because they harm “the unity and the security of
the community that we share.”120 The criminal law punishes the offender for
his harm to society, not to the victim.121
Criminal law uses different evidentiary standards than civil law because “it puts a higher value on certainty before imposing sanctions.”122
Commission of a crime results in different consequences than commission
of a civil wrong such as the breach of a contract. Whereas a civil wrongdoer
may be sued by a private plaintiff and be enjoined or have to pay damages
and face some moral opprobrium, a criminal wrongdoer may be arrested,
jailed, prosecuted by the government, and be fined, imprisoned, or even
executed. In general, criminal law imposes more drastic penalties than does
civil law.123 In general, society morally condemns the criminal more strongly than it does the civil wrongdoer.124 Crimes embody the concept of being
morally worse than civil wrongs, involving “real evil” rather than mere carelessness.125
Analyzing the failure to vacate statute with respect to the underlying
policy of the criminal law, harm to the public, it is difficult to see how the
unity and security of the community is threatened more by tenants remaining on premises and not paying rent than by some other comparable groups,
such as homeowners defaulting on promissory notes secured by mortgages.
In general, state law criminalizes neither the breach of a contract between
two private parties, the breach of covenants connected with the transfer of
an interest in real property, nor the failure to pay a debt.
Imagine for a moment a statute that criminalizes the mother who buys a
refrigerator at Sears on credit, cannot make all the payments, and doesn’t
return the appliance. Imagine another statute that criminalizes a subdivision
resident who installs a clothesline in the back yard, in violation of a restrictive covenant. Imagine a third statute that criminalizes the husband and wife
117. LAFAVE, supra note 98, § 1.2(b).
118. Id. § 1.2(e).
119. Id. § 1.3(b).
120. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past,
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 426 (2008).
121. Id.; see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1809 (1992).
122. Mann, supra note 121, at 1811.
123. LAFAVE, supra note 98, § 1.3(a).
124. Id.
125. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 19 (1996).
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who default on their mortgage payment and remain in occupation of the
premises. How much easier it would be for the creditor holding a security
interest in the property to simply give the couple ten days to leave, after they
have been in default for several months! The creditor could forego the services of an attorney and head to the prosecutor’s office to fill out an affidavit once the ten days had passed. Instead of nervously checking the mail for
notices, defaulting homeowners could instead wait for the knock of the police at their doors. No statute in any state criminalizes such defaults. Civil
courts exist to remedy private wrongs, such as breach of contracts or covenants or default on a note secured by a mortgage, which are the closest legal
analogies to default on a lease.
“Victim compensation” or “restitution” to the landlord (payment of the
alleged rent owed) is virtually mandatory under the Arkansas statute, as
though it is a strange hybrid of civil and criminal law. Although few if any
courts interpret it this way, it reads as though failure to pay the alleged
amount of rent due into the court deprives the tenant of a trial, because payment is a prerequisite. More courts do follow the portion of the statute that
convicts the tenant of a more serious crime (a Class B misdemeanor as opposed to an unclassified misdemeanor) if the alleged amount of rent due has
not been deposited. Nonetheless, as Appendix A shows, few courts require
the deposits.
As Professor Goforth pointed out ten years ago, the failure to vacate
statute unfairly “single[s] out landlords for the special and unique privilege
to having debts which they claim as due and owing enforced at the expense
of taxpayers through the criminal justice system.”126 No other state places
landlords in this category, and no other Arkansas statute allows creditors to
use the criminal justice system to collect their debts. The closest analogy in
Arkansas law was struck down as unconstitutional in 1991.127
What justifies giving landlords this powerful and arguably unfair advantage? The Arkansas Supreme Court was sympathetic to the landlord’s
arguments in support of the failure to vacate statute in Poole v. State, decided in 1968, declaring that the tenant in that case “does not base her continued possession upon any claim of right whatever, except a right to force the
owner to the expense of bond, attorney’s fees, and irrecoverable court costs
in civil litigation.”128 The court viewed tenants occupying the premises during their lease term but late with the rent as “criminal trespassers.”129 Under
common law, however, as noted above, a tenant late with the rent during the
126. Goforth, supra note 11, at 29.
127. State v. Riggs, 305 Ark. 217, 220, 807 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1991). See infra text accompanying notes 168 through 181 for more discussion of this case.
128. Poole v. State, 244 Ark. 1222, 1226, 428 S.W.2d 628, 630 (1968).
129. Id., 428 S.W.2d at 630.
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lease term was not viewed as a trespasser because of the doctrine of independent covenants; a landlord was limited to the remedy of suing for the
rent.130 If a lease is still in force, it is legally impossible for a tenant to be a
trespasser. Prior to the enactment of the failure to vacate statute, a landlord
would have to sue in unlawful detainer or ejectment to evict a tenant who
stopped paying rent during the term of the lease. In fact, the Arkansas Supreme Court later clarified that a tenant prosecuted under Arkansas Code,
Annotated, section 18-16-101 could not be prosecuted for criminal trespass.131 One feature of section 18-16-101 that changes the common law,
however, is the provision that causes forfeiture of the tenant’s interest upon
nonpayment of the rent.132 In other words, once the day on which rent is due
ends, under section 18-16-101, the tenant who has not paid no longer possesses a leasehold; it has been forfeited by operation of law.
In 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Munson v. Gilliam, stated as dictum that the conclusion “[t]hat a tenant who
fails, without justification, to pay rent is in effect stealing property from the
landlord and should be criminally punished, is a conclusion available to a
state under the Constitution.”133 No other state, however, has reached this
conclusion.
Another public policy to consider is whether this law unfairly burdens
the poor. Unpaid rent, court costs, and fines fall within the category of unpaid criminal justice debt, or “legal financial obligations” (LFOs): “all fines,
fees and costs associated with a criminal sentence.”134 LFOs may have the
effect of injuring defendants’ incomes, credit ratings, prospects for employ130. See supra text accompanying notes 2 through 4 for this discussion.
131. Polk v. State, 28 Ark. App. 282, 772 S.W.2d 368 (1989); Williams v. City of Pine
Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 683 S.W.2d 923 (1985).
132. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2003).
133. Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that evidence was insufficient to justify a federal district court injunction against the Pulaski County prosecutor from
prosecuting tenants under the failure to vacate statute). The case was a § 1983 class action,
and the Eighth Circuit’s decision was an interlocutory appeal. The validity of the statute was
not directly considered, and the Eighth Circuit determined that the standard for an injunction
that would halt “an existing state criminal prosecution” was “the threat of irreparable injury
‘both great and immediate’” which was not present. Id.
134. For general background on LFOs, see Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah
Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2010),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines
%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2013); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A
PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS (2010), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter IN FOR A PENNY]; Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Liability to Pay, and the Original
Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 833 (2013); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117
PENN. ST. L. REV. 349 (2012).
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ment and housing, and even freedom, if they are jailed. LFOs may “ensnare”
defendants in the criminal justice system.135 They have a disproportionate
effect on the poor. LFOs are a modern type of debtors’ prison, and arguably
the failure to vacate statute contributes to a host of factors that may capsize
a poor tenant’s life.136
High LFOs may violate the United States Constitution, as the United
States Supreme Court ruled in 1983 in Bearden v. Georgia.137 In that case,
Bearden pled guilty to burglary and theft by receiving, and was sentenced to
probation and a $750 fine.138 He borrowed money to pay the first installments, but lost his job and was sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder
of his probationary sentence, despite the fact that he had engaged in a goodfaith effort to find a job.139 The Court held that if probationers could not pay
their fines, despite bona fide efforts to do so, courts must consider alternate
means of punishment, other than prison.140
Somewhat ironically, the poorest of the poor Arkansans, who are most
likely living in public or Section 8 housing, are not subject to Arkansas
Code, Annotated, section 18-16-101, because HUD has prohibited housing
authorities and Section 8 landlords from using it.141 Federal regulations require such landlords to evict tenants only by “judicial action pursuant to
State or local law.”142 In 1978, a Pine Bluff Legal Aid attorney raised the
issue of whether the failure to vacate statute complied with this regulation.
HUD opined that the failure to vacate statute was not “judicial action for
eviction.”143 Instead, it was “merely a criminal statute that is utilized to force
a tenant to vacate property under threat of fine. No reference at any point in
the statute is made to eviction.”144A 1981 letter from HUD to landlords
listed the programs to which this directive applied: low-rent public housing,
Section 8 existing housing, Section 8 new and substantial rehabilitation

135. IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 134, at 6.
136. For examples of tenants’ lives adversely affected over the long term by landlords’
misconduct and the failure to vacate statute, see PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 33–34.
137. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
138. Id. at 662.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 672.
141. 24 C.F.R. § 247.6 (2013).
142. Id.
143. Memo from Robert E. Moore to Sterling Cockrill, HUD Area Director, Roger N.
Zachritz, Deputy Area Director, and Andy L. Watts, Director, Housing Management, May
24, 1978 (on file with author).
144. Id.
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housing, Sections 202, 221(d)(3) or (5) below market interest rate housing,
Section 236 interest reduction, and rent supplement housing.145
The policy still stands; HUD has not since granted permission to federally subsidized landlords and housing authorities to use the failure to vacate
statute to evict tenants. A question worth asking, however, is whether it is
being enforced. During the writing of this article, the author was informed
that a housing authority in northeast Arkansas is using the failure to vacate
statute to evict tenants. If prosecutors do not inquire and tenants are unrepresented by counsel, there may well be violation of the federal regulations.
E.

Unconstitutionality

As one commenter has pointed out, the failure to vacate statute violates
constitutional due process, but that is not where the constitutional concerns
ends.146 This section outlines the statute’s other constitutional deficiencies,
including arguable violation of the prohibition of imprisonment for debt,
disproportional punishment, and lack of the presumption of innocence.
1.

Due Process

Federal and state constitutions limit legislatures’ powers to create
crimes. Professor Goforth ably detailed several constitutional deficiencies of
the failure to vacate statute in her article. Briefly, she argued first a violation
of due process because the United States Supreme Court has ruled that debtors must receive a hearing prior to depriving the debtor of property and the
Arkansas statute requires tenants overstaying the ten-day notice period to
“post bond” in an amount alleged by a third party, prior to a hearing.147 In
other words, a criminal procedure mandates a pre-hearing payment that is
similar to an illegal civil pre-hearing attachment by a creditor.
Second, she argued that there is a second violation of due process because of the requirement that a tenant “who wishes to enter a ‘not guilty’
plea to the criminal charge of ‘failure to vacate’ must pay the full amount of
allegedly due rent into court.”148 This payment requirement, obviously, interferes with the due process right to a fair trial. In essence, the tenant must
pay to plead not guilty. Both of these statutory provisions remain in effect
today.

145. Special Letter 81-4d from Roger N. Zachritz, HUD Deputy Area Director, to “All
Public Housing Authorities and Owners of HUD Subsidized Projects,” April 16, 1981 (on file
with author).
146. Goforth, supra note 11, at 23.
147. Id. at 24–25.
148. Id. at 25–26.
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The Arkansas Constitution states that “[e]very person is entitled to a
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his
person, property or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without
purchase; completely, and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws.”149 Those tenants unjustly accused under the failure to
vacate statute must “purchase their justice” in some courts by posting the
alleged rent due in order to either plead not guilty or to prevent being convicted of a more serious offense.
Because most tenants are unrepresented by counsel, and most cases
never go beyond the arraignment, the statute has been cited by only ten appellate decisions since 1968, all but one in state courts. No court has ruled
on its constitutionality since the 2001 amendment requiring the payment of
alleged rent due, and thus the second due process issue mentioned above has
not been litigated.
As Professor Goforth noted, the statute in its pre-2001 form was found
to be constitutional in Duhon v. State.150 In Duhon, Jacksonville tenant Bridget Duhon first argued that Arkansas’s statute was unconstitutional, citing as
authority Matthews v Eldridge, a case wherein the United States Supreme
Court held that the denial of social security benefits without an evidentiary
hearing did not violate due process.151 The Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished Matthews on the ground that Arkansas Code, Annotated, section 1816-101 required a hearing to determine whether the tenant has willfully refused to vacate.152 As Professor Goforth stated, “[s]ince the existence of the
right to a hearing was central to the Duhon court’s conclusion that the Arkansas criminal eviction statute was constitutional, it seems relatively clear
that the [2001] amendment will have placed the statute as currently written
outside the result and rationale of that opinion.”153
Duhon’s second argument, citing Shelton v. Tucker, a United States
Supreme Court decision,154 was that the statute was not the least restrictive
means available to advance the purpose of the act because it stifled a fundamental liberty, and that there was a civil remedy (unlawful detainer)

149. ARK. CONST., art. 2, § 13.
150. Goforth, supra note 11, at 27; see Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 508–09, 774
S.W.2d 830, 834 (1989).
151. Duhon, 299 Ark. at 508–09, 774 S.W.2d at 834 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976)).
152. Id., 774 S.W.2d at 834.
153. Goforth, supra note 11, at 27.
154. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (holding Arkansas statute compelling
teachers to file an annual affidavit stating every organization to which they belonged during
past five years, as condition of reappointment, to be unconstitutional).

2013]

THE HANDS OF THE STATE

27

available as a better alternative.155 The Arkansas Supreme Court responded
that no fundamental right was at stake in Duhon’s case.156
Duhon’s third argument was that the statute was not a valid exercise of
the state’s police power, and that Poole v. State, which held the statute constitutional on that ground,157 should be overruled.158 Poole, discussed briefly
above, validated the statute on the grounds that 1) statutes are presumed to
be constitutional, especially if they have been in force for a long time; 2) in
Arkansas, the right to acquire, possess, and protect property is “inherent and
inalienable and declared higher than any constitutional sanction”; and 3)
under Arkansas Code, Annotated, section 18-16-101 tenants are criminal
trespassers, and it is within the police power to protect the “public” from
such harm.159
Addressing these reasons, it certainly is a rule of constitutional law that
statutes are presumed to be constitutional. As another Arkansas Supreme
Court decision has noted, however, “while these rules [the presumption of
constitutionality] generally govern constitutional challenges, that is not so
when the safeguards of personal liberties are at issue.”160 The court used this
language while striking down a statute, discussed in detail below, that criminalized the failure to pay a supplier or subcontractor for materials.161 Similarly, the right not to be subjected to criminal penalties for breach of a lease
is an important personal liberty.
With respect to the Poole court’s second argument, concerning the
right to acquire, possess, and protect property, the phrase “higher than any
constitutional sanction”162 apparently comes from the Kentucky Constitution
of 1850, and was used in conjunction with the right to own slaves.163 In the
Arkansas Constitution, it precedes a sentence about eminent domain and is
only rarely construed outside of that context.164 In any case, as a section in
the “Declaration of Rights” article of the Constitution, the section should be
construed as limiting the state’s right to interfere with property interests and
155. Duhon, 299 Ark. at 509, 774 S.W.2d at 834 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960)).
156. Id., 774 S.W.2d at 834.
157. Poole v. State, 244 Ark. 1222, 428 S.W.2d 628 (1968).
158. Duhon, 299 Ark. at 509–10, 774 S.W.2d at 835.
159. Poole, 244 Ark. at 1225, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
160. State v. Riggs, 305 Ark. 217, 220, 807 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1991).
161. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 33.
162. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22. The full text of the section reads “[t]he right of property is
before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken,
appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor.” Id.
163. “The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and the
right of the owner of a slave to such slave, and its increase, is the same, and as inviolable as
the right of the owner of any property whatever.” KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 3.
164. See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 23.
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not, as the Supreme Court in Poole seems to intimate, to justify state action
such as the failure to vacate statute protecting landlords’ property interests.
Additionally, since the Poole decision, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that “the right [of tenants being sued in forcible entry and detainer] to
continued residence in their homes” is “a significant interest in property.”165
Tenants as well as landlords have property rights, but the failure to vacate
statute does not balance them fairly.
With respect to the Poole court’s concluding argument, as discussed
above, the common law does not make such tenants criminal trespassers; the
allegedly unconstitutional failure to vacate law, in effect does.
2.

Imprisonment for Debt

A tenant who does not pay the alleged amount of rent due into court, if
convicted, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.166 Imprisonment of up to
ninety days is one sanction for a Class B misdemeanor. The survey revealed
that some courts do jail tenants who refuse to move off of the premises and
who have not paid the alleged amount of rent due. Jail under such circumstances, either pre-trial or post-conviction, violates article II, section 16 of
the Arkansas Constitution, which states “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for
debt in any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of
fraud.”167
Arkansas Supreme Court precedent invalidating a similar statute already exists. In 1989, the legislature enacted a statute that criminalized the
knowing or willful failure of a principal contractor or subcontractor to pay a
supplier or subcontractor for goods furnished to a project within thirty days
of final receipt of payment under a contract.168 Gary Riggs was arrested on
two misdemeanor counts of violating the statute, convicted in municipal
court, and fined almost $4,000.169 He appealed to the Independence County
Circuit Court, which dismissed the conviction, agreeing with Riggs that the
statute violated article II, section 16 of the Arkansas Constitution.170 The
state appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by holding the statute unconstitutional.171
165. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982). In fact, one could actually invert the
reasoning in Poole and contend that the failure to vacate statute is unconstitutional because it
deprives tenants of a valuable property interest—the leasehold—without due process.
166. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2003).
167. ARK. CONST. art II., § 16.
168. 1989 Ark. Acts 303 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-525) (quoted in State v.
Riggs, 305 Ark. 217, 218, 807 S.W.2d 32, 32 (1991)).
169. State v. Riggs, 305 Ark. 217, 218, 807 S.W.2d 32, 32 (1991).
170. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 32.
171. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 32.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of unconstitutionality. In its analysis, it relied on its decision in an earlier case, Peairs v.
State.173 Peairs also involved a statute that made it a felony for a contractor
who, having been paid all or a portion of the contract price, failed or refused
to discharge the lien.174 The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional
because it did not make “fraud or fraudulent intent a part or prerequisite of
the criminal offense. It is the absence of such language in the statutes which
makes it violative of that portion of the constitution above quoted.”175 The
court noted that the statute criminalized failing to discharge a lien, which is
failure to pay a debt.176 It reasoned that “[i]t is not difficult to imagine many
situations in which a contractor might be prevented from paying the subcontractor . . . even though he may have acted in . . . good faith and without any
intent to defraud anyone, yet, under the wording of the statute, he could be
convicted of a felony.”177 Exactly the same could be said about the failure to
vacate statute, except that it is a misdemeanor and not a felony.
By the time of the Riggs case, the legislature had modified the statute
to add a “knowingly or willfully” requirement.178 The state claimed this was
enough to distinguish Peairs and withstand Riggs’s constitutionality challenge.179 It cited California precedent, with a similar constitutional provision
and statute.180 The court was not impressed, however, and relied on opposing Colorado precedent.181
Acknowledging the state’s argument that statutes are presumed to be
constitutional, and citing Duhon182 for the proposition, the court nevertheless
stated “[a]s in the case of all constitutional provisions designed to protect
the liberties of the individual, every doubt must be resolved in favor of the
172

172. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 32.
173. 227 Ark. 230, 297 S.W.2d 775 (1957).
174. Id. at 231, 297 S.W.2d at 775.
175. Id. at 232, 297 S.W.2d at 776.
176. Id., 297 S.W.2d at 776.
177. Id., 297 S.W.2d at 776.
178. State v. Riggs, 305 Ark. 217, 219, 807 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1991).
179. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 33.
180. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 33 (citing People v. Howard, 451 P.2d 401, 403 (Cal. 1969)).
181. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 33. The court also cited an A.L.R. annotation that cited cases
from several jurisdictions as authority for the proposition that such statutes are unconstitutional if they do not require the element of intent to defraud. See Wade R. Habeeb, Validity
and Construction of Statute Providing Criminal Penalties for Failure of Contractor Who has
Received Payment from Owner to Pay Laborers or Materialmen, 78 A.L.R.3d 563, § 3[b]
(1977).
182. Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989). See supra text accompanying
notes 150 through 159 for a discussion of Duhon. Bridget Duhon could not have raised the
Riggs case in her defense because the legislature did not insert the possibility of jail as a
sanction until 2001.
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citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision that no person shall
be imprisoned for debt.”183
One is hard put to find a meaningful distinction between Riggs and the
current failure to vacate law, which requires only “willful” intent and failure
to pay the deposit of alleged rent due for violation of a Class B misdemeanor. The failure to vacate statute is a misdemeanor; Riggs was charged with a
misdemeanor. The intent to defraud was not an element of the Riggs statute;
it is not an element of the failure to vacate statute. The Peairs court noted
that without the element of intent to defraud, contractors innocent of bad
faith could be found guilty and deprived of personal liberty.184 The same
possibility was present in Riggs and is also present under the failure to vacate statute. The constitutionality of the current iteration of the failure to
vacate statute has not yet been litigated. If and when it is, distinguishing
Riggs will be difficult.
3.

Proportionality and Unusual Punishment

Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States and the Declaration
of Rights of the Arkansas Constitution prohibit excessive bail, excessive
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.185 These provisions reflect a codification of the “proportionality” principle of criminal procedure, that the
penalty be proportional to the crime. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportionate to
the offense.186 “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”187 Indeed, part of the
Court’s proportionality analysis is “to compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”188 The Court has not
yet ruled on the proportionality of the sentence for a crime that is not a
crime in any other jurisdiction.
Consider the hypothetical case of an innocent tenant with an unscrupulous landlord. Rent is due January 1 but the tenant has not paid, perhaps
because of a misunderstanding with the landlord. On January 2 the tenant
forfeits the rest of her lease term, no matter its length. If the landlord serves
the written notice on her on the second, she has ten days to remove herself
and her property from the premises. If she fails to do so, she can be fined for
each day she stays. If, because she cannot find another place to live within
ten days, she is served with a summons or a warrant, she may be required to
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Riggs, 305 Ark. at 220, 807 S.W.2d at 33.
Peairs v. State, 227 Ark. 230, 235, 297 S.W.2d 775, 777 (1957).
U.S. CONST. amend VIII; ARK. CONST. art II, § 8.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
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travel to the courthouse to post bond, or face jail. In most courts, fortunately,
she will not have that problem, but then if she attempts to plead not guilty
some courts will require her to pay the amount of rent the landlord alleges is
due, in order to have a trial. If for some reason she misses her court date,
instead of a default judgment against her a warrant will be issued for her
arrest. If she appears at trial, most likely she will not have legal representation, and her opponent will be not her landlord, but the state, in essence representing her landlord free of charge. If she is found guilty and cannot pay
the resulting fine levied, again she may face jail. Forfeiture of a lease term,
fines, costs, payment of rent to the landlord, the possibility of criminal conviction—all for one day’s late rent, where a tenant is acting in good faith—
arguably this is cruel and unusual punishment.
4.

The Presumption of Innocence

An axiom of criminal law in the United States is that the defendant is
presumed innocent. In other words, the defendant need not prove her innocence. Yet that axiom does not hold true in failure to vacate cases. It is true
that many tenants who are charged with failure to vacate are simply attempting to occupy the premises before not paying the rent catches up with them.
But in a state where there is no duty of the landlord to keep premises habitable, it is understandable that tenants’ unhappiness with repairs never made
eventually may reach the point where they pay for repairs or withhold the
rent in protest until repairs are made. And the unscrupulous landlord knows
that at that point he can evict the tenant, and find someone new to begin the
cycle again. Repairs aside, there are some instances where the rare landlord
simply lies to the court about the tenant, yet in the world of the failure to
vacate statute those landlords do not exist.
For the tenant who is honestly late with the rent, whose landlord is
falsely accusing her, or who is tired of repeated broken promises by the
landlord and who feels she has no other options—the deck is stacked against
the tenant.189 There often seems to be no presumption of innocence in some
courts. The landlord’s word is taken as fact, and the tenant’s is not. The tenant may be required to pay a bond to be released prior to arraignment, or pay
the alleged rent due just to tell her story to the court. Few tenants are represented by counsel. For many with no previous contact with the criminal justice system the experience is frightening and shameful. The landlord has no
“skin in the game.” He can file a false affidavit; there will be no consequences. He pays no money to retain an attorney; the prosecutor will do his
189. There are numerous examples in Pay the Rent, and this author was confronted with
two egregious examples of real-life landlord misconduct just during the period while researching this article.
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work at no charge to him. The failure to vacate statute is the underlying
cause of this imbalance.
F.

Current Alternate Eviction Methods

Like an irresistible force, landlords all over Arkansas are seeking to
evict tenants by the least expensive ways possible: these include illegal selfhelp, the failure to vacate statute, and an invalid civil eviction statute. A
significant number of residential landlords are unhappy with the unlawful
detainer statute.190 There is an alternative eviction statute already on the
books: a “civil eviction” statute, enacted as part of the Arkansas Residential
Landlord Tenant Act of 2007, that would allow landlords to sue in district
court to evict tenants.191 There are two issues with this statute. First, it is
biased against tenants, as Marshall Prettyman noted in his article.192 To
summarize his arguments: 1) the service provisions are unclear and possibly
deficient; 2) tenants’ due process rights are inadequately protected; and 3) if
a tenant contests an eviction, the statute is unacceptably vague about the
procedure to be followed.193 The second issue with the statute is jurisdictional, whether district courts have jurisdiction to hear these “civil eviction”
cases. Prettyman ably discussed this issue as well, but this article will add a
few new points to the debate.
Amendment 80, section 7(B) of the Arkansas Constitution states that
the “subject matter” of civil cases heard by district courts will be determined
by Supreme Court rule.194 Under the Supreme Court’s Administrative Order
No. 18, “local” district courts (including small claims courts) have concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts to hear matters in contract not exceeding
$5,000.195 State district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with circuit
courts to hear matters in contract not exceeding $25,000.196 However, district courts do not have the independent power to issue eviction orders.
Jurisdiction over district courts is not limited to the Arkansas Supreme
Court, however. Amendment 80, section 9 states that any court rule promulgated under sections 5, 6(B), 7(B), 7(D), or 8 “may be annulled or amended,
190. See infra text accompanying note 201 for this discussion.
191. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-901 to -911 (Supp. 2013).
192. Marshall Prettyman, Landlord Protection Law Revisited: the Amendments to the
Arkansas Residential Landlord–Tenant Act of 2007, A.C.A. 18-17-101 through 913, 35 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1031 (2013) [hereinafter Prettyman, Revisited]; see also Marshall
Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101 Et Seq., 2008 ARK. L.
NOTES 71 [hereinafter Prettyman, Landlord Protection].
193. Prettyman, Revisited, supra note 192.
194. ARK. CONST. amend 80, § 7(B).
195. ARK. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 18 (last amended Dec. 13, 2012).
196. Thus, pro se landlords can sue tenants for unpaid rent in small claims court, as many
a court responded to the researchers.
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in whole or in part, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the membership of each
house of the General Assembly.”197
The Residential Landlord Tenant Act of 2007 placed jurisdiction over
“civil eviction” cases in the district court.198 It passed the House of Representatives twice, the second time to concur with a Senate amendment. That
final vote of the House was ninety-three yeas, two nays, and five not voting.
However, the Senate vote was twenty-two yeas, zero nays, twelve not voting
and one excused. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is twenty-four votes.199
Thus, the Residential Landlord Tenant Act did not place jurisdiction over
civil evictions in district courts, and district courts are without authority to
hear those types of evictions.
In 2009, the legislature made numerous minor amendments to the civil
eviction statute. One was to insert a phrase that eviction could be commenced “in a district court having jurisdiction over the eviction proceeding.”200 This wording, however, does not place jurisdiction in district courts.
It is clear, then, that district courts do not currently have jurisdiction to hear
civil eviction cases. Nonetheless, as Appendix A reveals, one of the most
surprising findings of the research for this article was that at least several
district courts are hearing such cases, and at least one district court is hearing significant numbers of them. Courts that do so seem to be switching
from failure to vacate to civil eviction, if they heard failure to vacate cases
before.
The Commission was told that illegal landlord self-help evictions take
place in certain counties, and in the course of this research the author heard
of additional locations where they occur. It is the author’s belief that selfhelp evictions are much more widespread and frequent than most people
would suspect.
It is clear that unlawful detainer in its present form is not working. The
Commission spent more time discussing eviction than any other single issue.
Landlords criticized the unlawful detainer statute for the filing fee ($165),
the waiting time before a hearing (weeks, at least) and the need for an attorney to file the action. Landlords said that in a few sparsely populated counties attorneys were simply not available. Another complaint was the perceived high fees that attorneys would charge.201
197. ARK. CONST. amend 80, § 9.
198. “The district court or appropriate court of this state shall exercise jurisdiction over
any landlord with respect to any conduct in this state governed by this chapter or with respect
to any claim arising from a transaction subject to this chapter.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-203
(Supp. 2013).
199. PARLIAMENTARY MANUAL OF THE SENATE, 89TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Rule 23.02
(2013), http://arkansas.gov/senate/docs/2013-SenateRules.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-901(a) (Supp. 2013).
201. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court has made possible a procedure whereby
an unlawful detainer action filed in circuit court could then be referred to a
state district court if all parties consented.202 However, this does not address
the cost and attorney issues, and may not speed the process significantly.
Both the Commission and the author have sought to determine whether any
unlawful detainer cases are being referred. None of the sources asked were
aware of the existence of any such referrals.
G.

A Better Statutory Framework

What should a workable summary eviction statute look like? It would
apply only to residential landlords and tenants. It would combine the
strengths of both the unlawful detainer and the civil eviction statutes, and
eschew the weaknesses. The current statutes’ strengths and weaknesses may
be represented graphically.
Statute
Unlawful Detainer

Strengths
Fair to both sides
Clear procedure

Civil Eviction

Fast
Relatively inexpensive
Can be filed pro se (if
small claims rules used
most entity landlords
can file)
Tenant has opportunity
to cure203

Weaknesses
Slow
Relatively expensive
Necessitates an attorney
Tenant cannot cure
Service provisions are
unclear
Deficient due process
for tenants
Lack of any procedure if
tenant contests

A new statute should have the strengths of both unlawful detainer and
civil eviction and the weaknesses of neither. It should amend one of the two
already-existing statutes. If the unlawful detainer statute is amended, the
civil eviction statute should be repealed. As recommended by the Commission, the new law should anticipate pro se landlord and tenant representa202. ARK. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 18 (last amended Dec. 13, 2012).
203. Ark. Code Ann. section 18-17-701 allows a tenant to pay rent five days late, and
allows a landlord to give a tenant a two-week period to cure any other type of lease violation.
This provision would be meaningless, however, because the current failure to vacate statute
allows a landlord to file failure to vacate the moment the rent is late. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1817-701 (Supp. 2013).
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tion, by providing forms, either statutory or issued by the Arkansas Supreme
Court and available on the Internet.204 It should enable entity landlords such
as LLCs to appear through a designated non-attorney representative. Yet,
the statute should allow attorneys if the parties wish them. The first stage of
the hearing should take place in district court; almost all cases will end at
this first stage. However, tenants must be allowed to introduce evidence on
their own behalf, and to counterclaim. Either party should be able to appeal
to circuit court, for a de novo hearing with the right to a jury. This eviction
statute would cure perceived problems with the existing civil statutes, and
would more than justify repeal of the failure to vacate statute.
III. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Not only are tenants’ rights affected by the anomaly of Arkansas’s failure to vacate statute, but the impact is compounded because Arkansas does
not have an implied warranty of habitability. This section will outline the
history of the warranty, explain its scope, discuss current Arkansas law, and
recommend a warranty appropriate for the state.
A.

History

In the latter half of the twentieth century, courts and legislatures awakened to the reality of the relationship between the urban residential landlord
and tenant. The object of the tenant’s bargain was not, as in medieval times,
an unimproved tract of land that the tenant could farm or improve, but a
functioning, safe, sanitary living space, with working utilities and appliances. Tenants were no longer farmers, but individuals with full-time jobs away
from their living premises. Many landlords now routinely covenanted to
provide repairs. The recognition of these changes resulted in the creation of
the implied warranty of habitability.
Without the implied warranty, what is the common law with respect to
repairs? Absent a covenant to the contrary, landlords have no duty to repair.205 Tenants, as the occupants of the premises, have a duty not to commit
waste, which imposes a limited duty of repair.206 Failure to repair is viewed
as permissive waste.207 Tenants are responsible to return the premises in the
same condition in which they found them, with some exceptions.208 This
would require repair of damage they or persons on the premises with their
permission have caused. Typically, tenants are held to make the type of re204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
1 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 103 (2012 ed.).
Id. § 102.
Id.
Id.
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pairs that will keep the premises “wind and water tight.”209 But typically, a
tenant is not responsible for a major structural repair,210 such as a roof that
needs replacing, or repair of total casualty loss, such as a house destroyed by
a tornado or hurricane. Nor is a tenant responsible for ordinary wear and
tear.211
Arkansas courts follow the common law; the rule expressed in numerous cases is simply that absent a covenant to the contrary in the lease, a
landlord is not liable for any repair.212
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.213 is usually credited with being
the first decision to recognize the implied warranty.214 “[A]dequate heat,
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance” were described as part of
the “package” that a modern tenant expected when entering into a lease.215
Hot on the heels of Javins, in 1972 the Uniform Law Commission adopted
the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (URLTA),216 providing a statutory version of an implied warranty, as well as a comprehensive, balanced
framework of landlord-tenant law addressing creation and termination of
leases as well as rights and duties of landlords and tenants. Twenty-one
states enacted the URLTA.217 Most of the rest of the states enacted statutory

209. Id.; 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.05[c][2].
210. TIFFANY, supra note 205, § 102.
211. POWELL, supra note 209, § 56.05[c][2].
212. “At common law the lessor owed no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee.
Arkansas law follows this rule.” Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 38, 60 S.W.3d 415, 418
(2001). See also Huber Rental Properties, LLC v. Allen, 2012 Ark. App. 642, 8, ___ S.W.3d
___; Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 98 Ark. App. 102, 110, 250 S.W.3d 574, 580
(2007).
213. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1074.
216. For the text of the act see UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, 7B
U.L.A. 289 (2006). The text is also available on the website of the Uniform Law Commission
at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta%
201974.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
217. ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100
(2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 (2007 & Supp. 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
47a-7 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. §
521-42 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553
(West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-823 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1419 (LexisNexis 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 47-8-20 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §
118 (1999 & Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.320 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 34-18-22 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (LexisNexis
2005).
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warranties, some of which are modeled on the URLTA218 and some of which
are not.219 Georgia, for example, simply states that “[t]he landlord must keep
the premises in repair.”220 Illinois and New Jersey still rely on a judicial implied warranty of habitability.221
B.

What the Warranty Covers

The original statutory warranty in the URLTA is fairly short in length.
It requires landlords to do the following:
1. Comply with building and housing code provisions that materially
affect health and safety;
2. Do what is necessary to keep premises in a fit and habitable condition;
3. Keep common areas clean and safe;
4. Maintain electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating,
air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, that
are supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord;
5. Provide receptacles for garbage and arrange for its removal; and
6. Provide running water, hot water, and heat, unless these are under
the control of the tenant.222
The URLTA provides that a lease may not include a tenant’s waiver of
the implied warranty.223
Notable variations to this list include disclosing prior methamphetamine manufacture on the premises;224 maintaining structural components,
218. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-505 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305 (2009);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-8-5 (LexisNexis 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.290 (West
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (2004 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060
(West 2004 & Supp. 2014).
219. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2696 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (2003 & Supp. 2013); MD. CODE
ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161 (West 2002
& Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.234 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2006); 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1700-1 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED. LAWS § 43-32-8 (2004); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-3 (LexisNexis
2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4457 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 2001 & Supp.
2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1201 (2013).
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (2010).
221. Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. 1985); Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17
(N.J. 1973).
222. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 326 (2006).
223. Id. § 1.403, 7B U.L.A. 313.
224. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118(D) (1999 & Supp. 2014).
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such as doors, walls, and ceilings;225 controlling infestation by rodents and
insects, unless caused by the tenant;226 providing adequate locks and keys
and maintaining the security of master and duplicate keys; 227 providing
smoke detection devices228 and carbon monoxide detectors;229 eliminating
conditions contributing to mosquito infestation and mold caused by plumbing leaks or inadequate drainage;230 and not allowing falling or fallen plaster
from walls and ceilings.231
In a country of such climatic diversity and weather extremes as the
United States, one would expect to see, and there is to some extent, habitability contingent on climate. For example, Minnesota requires weather
proofing against cold if the cost will be realized by savings.232 New Hampshire requires an average heat of sixty-five degrees to be obtainable.233 Florida, on the other hand, requires screens.234
In 2011, the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Committee on the
Revised Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RURLTA) began work
on revisions to the original uniform law, which at that point was almost forty years old. At the time of this writing, the RURLTA was read for the first
time at the 2013 annual meeting of the Uniform Law Commission. It will
continue to be revised during the next one or two years, but at present, it
modifies the original implied warranty of habitability in the following ways:
1. Landlords must provide effective waterproofing and weather protection;
2. Plumbing facilities must be connected to an approved sewage disposal method;
3. Premises must be free of rodents, bedbugs and other vermin, mold,
radon, asbestos and other hazardous substances;
4. Exterior doors and windows must be secure, with working locks or
other security devices; and
5. If required by law landlords must provide other safety devices (such
as smoke detectors).235
225. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014).
226. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060(4).
227. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060(6), (7).
228. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51(2)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7024-303(h) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42(5) (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
59.18.060(12).
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42(7); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303.
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42(8)(l).
231. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14(V) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013).
232. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161(a)(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2014).
233. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14(XI).
234. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51(1)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014).
235. REVISED UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT § 303 (May 30, 2013
draft), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Landlord%20
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Thus, new additions to the warranty add to safety (locks, smoke detectors, etc.), sanitation (sewage disposal and freedom from vermin), and structural soundness.
C.

Limits on the Warranty
1.

Enforcement

The URLTA divides breaches of the implied warranty into three types.
For willful or negligent lack of “essential services,” such as heat or water,
tenants may after giving reasonable notice obtain such services or obtain
substitute housing and deduct the cost from their rent, recover diminution of
value damages, or terminate the lease.236 If the breach is one “materially
affecting health and safety,” after the landlord has had fourteen days in
which to repair the problem if no repair is affected the landlord can terminate the lease.237 If the breach is remediable by repair or damages and the
landlord remedies the breach by the date in the notice, the tenant cannot
terminate the lease.238
The URLTA also permits tenants to receive injunctive relief and actual
damages, and, in a significant change from the common law, allows tenants
to use self-help to repair if the cost of repair is low and the landlord has
failed to repair, deducting the amount from their rent, again with the exception for damage caused by the tenant.239 However, in none of these instances
will any liability be imposed on the landlord if the condition was caused by
the tenant, her family, or invitees or licensees.240
States have limited the implied warranty in different ways. Following
are just a few examples. Kansas exempts the landlord from his duties if he is
prevented by “an act of God, the failure of public utility services or other
conditions beyond the landlord’s control.”241 Pennsylvania restricts the warranty to cities of the first through third classes, but has a bright-line remedy—a landlord whose property is certified “unfit for human habitation” can
no longer collect rent from his tenants, until the property is either recertified
as fit or the lease is terminated for reasons other than nonpayment of rent.242
The tenant who continues occupation must deposit rent in a government-

and%20Tenant/2013AM_RURLTA_Draft.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
236. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383.
237. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383.
238. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375.
239. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.103, 7B U.L.A. 382.
240. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383.
241. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (2005).
242. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1700-1 (2012).

40

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

approved escrow account during the interval.243 Virginia limits the landlord’s liability to “actual damages” proximately caused by the landlord’s
failure to exercise ordinary care.244 It does not impose tort liability on landlords245 except for damages caused by negligent repair.246
2.

Liability for Damage or Injury to the Tenant’s Property or Person

One non-uniform area of landlord-tenant law is whether tenants or their
invitees may recover for such harms as personal injury, emotional distress,
or damage to personal property damage caused by a landlord’s breach of a
lease. In theory, there could be two legal theories justifying damages: contract law, under the theory of consequential damages, and tort law.247
a.

Breach of Contract

Consequential, or indirect, damages are damages that flow indirectly
from an act, rather than directly.248 American courts generally follow Hadley
v. Baxendale, an 1854 English decision holding that lost profits (consequential damages) are not recoverable under a contract unless specifically contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.249 Arkansas defines consequential damages as the “damage, loss or injury as does
not flow directly and immediately from the act of the party, but only from
some of the consequences or results of such act.”250 Consequential damages
are usually economic in nature, such as lost profits, but a few residential
tenants have attempted to obtain them for damage or injury to their persons
or personal property caused by the landlord’s alleged breach of the lease. In
such a case, the Indiana Supreme Court commented:
[R]ecovery for personal injury on a contract claim is allowable only
when the particular injury was within the parties’ contemplation during
contract formation. Thus, to claim consequential damages the tenant
must show the parties intended to compensate for personal injury losses
caused by the apartment’s unfitness. The tenant may prove the promise
243. Id.
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13(B) (2012).
245. Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Assocs., Inc., 644 S.E.2d 72, 78 (Va. 2007).
246. Sales v. Kecoughtan Hous. Co., 690 S.E.2d 91, 93–94 (Va. 2010).
247. For an excellent discussion comparing and contrasting the two theories of liability,
and also contrasting common law with civil law, see Melissa T. Lonegrass, Convergence in
Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in Comparative Perspective, 85 TULANE
L. REV. 413 (2010).
248. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
249. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
250. Optical Partners, Inc. v. Dang, 2011 Ark. 156, *15, 381 S.W.3d 46, 55 (quoting
Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 314 Ark. 591, 604–05, 864 S.W.2d 817, 825 (1993)).

2013]

THE HANDS OF THE STATE

41

to compensate personal injury by showing its expression as a contract
term or by pointing to evidence showing it to be implied in the agreement.251

As Lonegrass notes, few American courts have awarded claims for personal injury or personal property damage brought by residential tenants under a consequential damages theory.252 Only a handful of Arkansas cases
have considered consequential damages under a lease. In these cases, the
leases were commercial or agricultural. The types of consequential damages
claimed were lost profits,253 destroyed merchandise,254 and destroyed
crops.255
b.

Tort

Traditionally, landlords were not liable for tort damages, such as personal injury or damages to personal property of a tenant or her invitees,
caused by defective premises.256 This rule is often expressed as “caveat lessee.” The common law recognized only a few exceptions. Those typically
listed are injuries caused by common areas, undisclosed latent defects present at the beginning of the term, breaches of a covenant to repair, negligent
repairs, and defective areas used by the public.257 Arkansas recognizes only
two exceptions: failure to reasonably perform an agreement to repair that is
supported by consideration, and failure to reasonably repair under an assumed obligation.258
An extended discussion of tort liability of landlords is outside of the
scope of this article, but the issue is raised here to clarify that enactment of
an implied warranty of habitability does not automatically result in expand251. Johnson v. Scandia Associates, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations omitted) (refusing to award consequential damages for personal injury under an implied
warranty of habitability).
252. Lonegrass, supra note 247, at 427.
253. See, e.g., Optical Partners, Inc., 2011 Ark. at *1, 381 S.W.3d at 49 (awarding lost
profits for an unenforceable covenant not to compete).
254. See Shelton v. Albertson, No. CA 92-109, 1992 WL 79537, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App.
Apr. 15, 1992) (finding no proof that the appellee agreed to be responsible for more than
ordinary damages).
255. Bowling v. Carroll, 122 Ark. 23, 182 S.W. 514, 514–15 (1916) (denying damages
for the tenant’s crops destroyed by cattle when landlord did not repair fence).
256. Tort liability for tenants’ injuries caused by criminal acts of third persons is outside
the scope of this article.
257. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 6.46.
258. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013). See Kathryn Hake,
Comment, Is Home Where Arkansas’s Heart Is? State Adopts Unique Statutory Approach to
Landlord Tort Liability and Maintains Common Law “Caveat Lessee,” 59 ARK. L. REV. 737
(2006), for a discussion on the adoption of this statute.
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ed tort liability for landlords, although many persons erroneously assume
that it does. The URLTA does not expressly impose such liability, although
the comment to section 1.105 states that “[w]hether tort action, specific performance or equitable relief is available is determined not by this section but
by specific provisions and supplementary principles”259 and refers the reader
to Section 1.103, which provides that the act is supplemented by other principles of law and equity260 (interestingly, although a number of areas of law
such as bankruptcy and contract are mentioned, torts is not).
Even though the URLTA does not expressly impose tort liability on
landlords for tenant or third-party injury caused by breach of the implied
warranty, a significant number of states have done so, reasoning that the
implied warranty of habitability imposes a duty which, if breached, causes
tort liability.261 Other states have refused to impose liability in tort under the
implied warranty.262
D.

Current Arkansas Law

Arkansas currently follows the common law rule that a landlord has no
duty to repair unless he covenants to do so,263 subject to the two codified
exceptions noted above. If the landlord covenants to repair, property damages for defective premises typically take the form of the difference in value
between the defective premises and premises without defects, or the cost of
repair. Many, if not most, of the cases citing this rule are suits in tort for
personal injury to the tenant or her family members or invitees, or for dam-

259. URLTA § 1.105 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 295.
260. URLTA § 1.103, 7B U.L.A. 294.
261. See, e.g., Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1213 (Alaska 1994); Scott v. Garfield,
912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009) (holding a tenant’s invitee may recover for personal
injury caused by landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability); Joiner v. Haley,
777 So.2d 50, 52 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (conceding that a tenant may pursue tort remedies for
breach of implied warranty of habitability); Shorter v. Neapolitan, 902 N.E.2d 1061, 1067
(Oh. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that URLTA implied warranty of habitability expanded landlord tort liability from already-existing common law liability); Merrill v. Jansma, 86 P.3d
270, 289 ¶ 48 (Wyo. 2004) (holding landlord has a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances).
262. See, e.g., Schuman v. Kobets, 760 N.E.2d 682, 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Steward ex
rel. Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 251, 255 (Va. 2012) (holding the
implied warranty of habitability imposes duty in contract, not in tort); Favreau v. Miller, 591
A.2d 68, 73 (Vt. 1991); Lian v. Stalick, 25 P.3d 467, 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). Alabama
enacted the URLTA in 2007, but as amended to create no duties or causes of action in tort.
ALA. CODE ANN. § 35-9A-102(c) (Supp. 2013).
263. Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 38, 60 S.W.3d 415, 418 (2001); Propst v. McNeill,
326 Ark. 623, 624, 932 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1996); Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 108, 661
S.W.2d 393, 394 (1983).
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age to personal property.264 Few of them deal with defective premises preventing occupation or requiring repair. Of those that do, most involve commercial tenants. The warranty in these cases is often referred to as a warranty of habitability, but if the tenant is commercial, it is more accurately characterized as a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
A recent case concerning the duty to repair is Huber Rental Properties,
LLC v. Allen.265 A landlord sued tenants, who had sought to terminate their
lease and had moved out, under a rent acceleration clause.266 The landlord
also sought late fees and costs.267 The lease contained instructions for requesting repairs and maintenance.268 The dispute involved a carpet that had
not been cleaned at the beginning of the lease term, a garbage disposal with
insects living in it, a large tree limb that had fallen in a storm that blocked
the front door for weeks, and lack of keys to the side door, requiring the
tenants to leave the only usable door unlocked at all times.269 The trial court
found that the landlord materially breached the lease.270 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed that the landlord breached the duty of repair.271 Although the lease did not specifically state that the landlord promised to repair
the premises, the lease did include a procedure for tenants to request repairs
and maintenance.272 The problem with the lack of an implied warranty of
habitability, however, is that landlords like the one in this case will simply
remove all mention of repair from their leases.273 One way in which repair
could be facilitated without an implied warranty would be to prohibit landlords who have outstanding citations for code violations from bringing failure to vacate prosecutions. This would not work in an area with no housing
codes, however.
One of most important decisions discussing the implied warranty of
habitability in recent years has been Propst v. McNeill.274 In this case,
Propst, the owner of a plane, executed a lease with the Walnut Ridge Airport

264. Thomas, 347 Ark. at 38, 60 S.W.3d at 418; Stalter v. Akers, 303 Ark. 603, 798
S.W.2d 428 (1990).
265. 2012 Ark. App. 642, ___ S.W.3d ___.
266. Id. at 1, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
267. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___.
268. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
269. Id. at 3–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
270. Id. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
271. Huber Rental Props., 2012 Ark. App. 642, at 7, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
272. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
273. Legal Services attorneys report that they are seeing fewer leases with landlord repair
clauses. Duke & Fletcher Interview, supra note 69.
274. 326 Ark. 623, 932 S.W.2d 766 (1996); see also Stephen J. Maddox, Case Note,
Propst v. McNeill: Arkansas Landlord-Tenant Law, a Time for Change, 51 ARK. L. REV. 575
(1998).
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Commission.275 He stored his plane in a hangar at the airport.276 After a
storm damaged the hangar and his plane, Propst sued various parties, but
lost at the trial court level.277 On appeal, he first argued that Arkansas should
require landlords to exercise reasonable care with respect to the condition of
rental premises and repeal caveat lessee.278 Propst was arguing for tort liability to be imposed here so that he could recover the damages to his personal
property. One of the arguments the Commission made in response was that
the legislature and not the court should make such a momentous change in
the law.279 It pointed to the enactment of the URLTA as the means by which
legislatures were achieving this end.280 This was wrong on two points. First,
as discussed above, the URLTA does not expressly impose tort liability on
landlords. Second, the URLTA only applies to residential leases. It would
not have affected the airport lease even if Arkansas had enacted it.
The court noted the age of the rule of caveat lessee and stated its oftencited rule that it will uphold prior precedent unless “great injury or injustice”
would result.281 The court stated that even if it were inclined to overrule caveat lessee, the facts in Propst were not appealing—Propst was an experienced businessman.282
In a second very significant case, Thomas v. Stewart,283 the tenant
plaintiff again invited the court to overrule caveat lessee. In this case, Katherine Thomas’s child fell two stories when a balcony railing he was leaning
on collapsed.284 Thomas cited Propst, and in the court’s decision, denying
summary judgment in favor of the landlord, the court again noted its preference that the legislature take up the issue.285 The court stated that because
Thomas had not provided it with any information as to whether the legislature was taking action, it was hesitant to address the issue.286
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brown noted that it had been almost
thirty years since the URLTA was adopted and “undoubtedly” it had been
275. Propst, 326 Ark. at 624, 923 S.W.2d at 767.
276. Id., 923 S.W.2d at 767.
277. Id., 923 S.W.2d at 767.
278. Id. at 625, 932 S.W.2d at 767.
279. Id. at 625, 932 S.W.2d at 768.
280. Id. at 626, 932 S.W.2d at 768.
281. Propst, 326 Ark. At 626, 923 S.W.2d at 768. See Miller v. Enders, 2013 Ark. 23,
___ S.W.3d ___; McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, ___ S.W.3d ___ ; and
Independence Federal Bank v. Paine Webber, 302 Ark. 324, 789 S.W.2d 725 (1990) for the
latest expressions of the rule. The court almost always uses this phrase when declining to
overrule past precedent. It can be found in fifty-six decisions.
282. Propst, 326 Ark. at 627, 932 S.W.2d at 768.
283. 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415 (2001).
284. Id. at 36, 60 S.W.3d at 416.
285. Id. at 41, 60 S.W.3d at 421.
286. Id., 60 S.W.3d at 421.
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proposed to the General Assembly on several occasions during that time but
the legislature had never enacted it.287 In the three legislative sessions between Propst and Thomas, the legislature had taken no action.288 Justice
Brown opined that it would be appropriate for the court to address the issue
of landlord tort liability the next time it was presented with the issue.289 He
listed other areas of law where the court had acted, after unsuccessfully asking the legislature to take up the issue: abolishing tort immunity for political
subdivisions,290 abolishing the absolute rule of nonliability for vendors who
sell alcohol to minors,291 and imposing dramshop liability.292
The Supreme Court has recognized that it “has a duty to change the
common law when it is no longer reflective of economic and social needs of
society.”293 “Precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so
manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable. Any rule of law not
leading to the right result calls for rethinking and perhaps redoing.”294 In all
three of the cases, the court looked to other states and noted that Arkansas
was in the minority, and that the common law had evolved, or that statutes
had reversed the old common law rules. The same can be argued with respect to the implied warranty of habitability.
The URLTA was adopted in 1972. Looking only as far back as 1991, it
was introduced as one or more bills in the legislative sessions in 1991, 1993,
and 2001.295 The half favorable to landlords was enacted in 2007, after all
pro-tenant provisions were removed.296 Has the law in other states changed?
Yes. Arkansas stands alone as the only state without an implied warranty of
habitability.
One argument made by landlords against an implied warranty of habitability is that Arkansas’s rents are the lowest of any state, according to 2012
statistics released by the National Low Income Housing Coalition. In the
words of the Commission Report,
In the spring of 2012, the National Low Income Housing Coalition released its report on the state of rental housing availability for low income
renters, Out of Reach 2012. This report indicated that Arkansas had the
287. Id. at 43, 60 S.W.3d at 421 (Brown, J., concurring).
288. Id., 60 S.W.3d at 421.
289. Thomas, 347 Ark. at 43, 60 S.W.3d at 421.
290. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
291. Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997).
292. Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc., 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999).
293. Shannon, 329 Ark. at 151, 947 S.W.2d at 353.
294. Parish, 244 Ark. at 1252, 429 S.W.2d at 52.
295. It was introduced as House Bills 426, 1621, and 1851 in 1991; and as Senate Bill
373 in 2001.
296. The pro-landlord half of the URLTA is codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-17-101
through 18-17-802. See also generally Prettyman, Landlord Protection, supra note 192.
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lowest fair market rent (“FMR”) for a two-bedroom dwelling unit ($593
per month) of all fifty states. However, Arkansas was not drastically below all other states. West Virginia’s FMR was $598, South Dakota’s
$599, Kentucky’s $616, Mississippi’s $622, Iowa’s $637 and North Dakota’s $639. Lest the reader think that this means housing is a terrific
bargain in Arkansas, it should also be pointed out that Arkansas’s annual
median income (“AMI”), at $51,900, was the third lowest of the states.
Lower than Arkansas are Mississippi, at $48,871, and West Virginia, at
$51,549. All of these states have an implied warranty of habitability, two
of them (Iowa and Kentucky) have enacted the URLTA, and all but
North Dakota prohibit retaliatory eviction.297

Updating these statistics, the author discovered that despite Arkansas’s
extreme lack of tenant rights, it no longer has the lowest rent. That state is
now North Dakota, with a two-bedroom fair market rent of $627. Kentucky,
at $661, is in second place. Arkansas’s rent is $663.298 No longer can the
inference be made that Arkansas’s rent is lowest because, unlike all other
states, it has no implied warranty of habitability. Marshall Prettyman has
also pointed out some factors having a causal effect on low rents, such as
low property taxes.299 Very few studies have been made of the effect of an
implied warranty on rent rates. The most recent is a student comment published in 2011. The author states that “[t]o the extent that this Comment attempts to determine whether or not the implied warranty is related to higher
rent rates, the conclusion appears affirmative.”300 However, there is another
way to think of the warranty besides aggregate rental statistics, and that is its
effect on individual landlords and tenants, where it will allow a tenant in
unlivable conditions to compel a change that she could not before, or where
a landlord will have clear guidance as to the minimum quality of premises to
be supplied to tenants.
Another argument against implied warranties of habitability is that they
are not needed because tenants can simply report deficiencies in housing to
code enforcement agencies. First, not all areas of the state are covered by
housing codes. Most rural areas and many smaller cities and towns are not.
Second, the tenant who reports her landlord to code enforcement will, like
the tenant observed by the author at the Little Rock Criminal Court clerk’s
office, be the object of retaliation by the landlord. If the tenant is month-tomonth, the landlord can simply terminate the lease in less than two months.
If not, and the landlord is unscrupulous enough, the landlord can simply
297. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
298. NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 2013, available at
http://nlihc.org/oor/2013 (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
299. Prettyman, Revisited, supra note 192.
300. Michael A. Brower, Comment, The “Backlash” of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: Theory v. Analysis, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 889 (2011) (emphasis added).
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refuse to accept the rent, or otherwise misrepresent the facts on the failure to
vacate affidavit. It is for this reason that an implied warranty of habitability
must be accompanied by a prohibition against retaliatory eviction, which
most states have.
As the plaintiff in Stewart recognized, probably the most analogous
case to an implied warranty of habitability for tenants is Wawak v. Stewart,
which judicially adopted an implied warranty of quality for new home construction in Arkansas.301 As modified by subsequent decisions, the warranty
applies to material latent defects in construction.302 It lasts for five years
from substantial completion of construction.303 The measure of damages is
either the cost of repair, or the difference in value between the promised
structure and the defective structure.304 The implied warranty does not impose a duty of care, and does not sound in tort. However, negligence has
traditionally been available as a cause of action against negligent workmanship by contractors.305
The Wawak case was well briefed on appeal. The court invited amicus
curiae briefs, and at least two were filed, by the Arkansas Attorney General
and by the Arkansas Homebuilders Association.306 The court was eager to
join the minority, but modern trend of decisions adopting the warranty—it
refers to six states having adopted it in the previous decade.307 The decision
is full of citations to secondary authority and quotations from the decisions
of other states. In support of its decision the court mentioned the lack of
bargaining power between the home builder and buyer, and the modern need
for such a warranty. The court stated “[a]s might be expected, we have been
presented with the timeworn, threadbare argument that a court is legislating
whenever it modifies common-law rules to achieve justice in the light of
modern economic and technological advances.”308
E.

A Warranty for Arkansas

If the author could fashion an implied warranty for Arkansas, what
form would it take? First, the warranty should be statutory. It should contain
the requirements of the RURLTA warranty with the qualification, adopted
by some states, that plumbing and electrical work be in compliance with
301. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970).
302. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 642, 128 S.W.3d 438, 443 (2003).
303. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112(a) (Repl. 2005); Rogers v. Mallory, 328 Ark. 116,
119–20, 941 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1997).
304. Daniel v. Quick, 270 Ark. 528, 533, 606 S.W.2d 81, 84 (1980).
305. See, e.g., Marshall v. Turman Const. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 686, ___ S.W.3d ___.
306. Wawak, 247 Ark. at 1094, 1099, 449 S.W.2d at 923, 925.
307. Id. at 1095, 449 S.W.2d at 923.
308. Id. at 1099, 449 S.W.2d at 925.
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codes in force at the time they were installed. It should have a provision
requiring a quicker response for emergency repairs, recognizing that repair
response time is sometimes out of the control of the landlord, and a reasonable repair and deduct provision, especially if a landlord refuses to make a
qualifying repair.
Second, tenants should be able to sue under the warranty as easily as
landlords should be able to sue for eviction. Tenants should be able to bring
suit in district or small claims court, using official forms, such as the Commission recommended for eviction suits.309 They should be able to bring
suits pro se. Most importantly, they should be able to raise the issue of the
breach of the implied warranty as a defense to a landlord’s eviction action.
Third, tenants must not be able to waive their right to the warranty, and
must not be subject to retaliatory eviction. An implied warranty is of little
good if tenants are forced to sign leases giving up their rights to repairs, and
can easily be evicted if they complain to code enforcement.
In lieu of a statutory warranty, the way is clear, given Supreme Court
statements in previous cases, for the court to find a judicial warranty, on
condition that the right case comes along. With respect to tort liability, the
clear trend is for some type of tort liability of landlords for personal injury
or property damage caused by a landlord’s breach of the implied warranty.
The Supreme Court has indicated its willingness to take up the issue, in an
appropriate case. At a minimum, Arkansas should impose the duty to keep
common areas clean and safe, and impose tort liability for failure to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arkansas is seriously out of step with the rest of the United States in
two important areas of landlord-tenant law: its crime of failure to vacate,
and the lack of an implied warranty of habitability. The last enactments of
the legislature in this area, in 2001 and 2007, produced a criminal statute
with grave constitutional deficiencies and a lopsided civil statute containing
mostly landlord rights and tenant obligations. Landlord-tenant legislation
should be drafted by representatives of both landlords and tenants. The
Landlord-Tenant Study Commission was a first step in this direction, but it
had no time to draft legislation. Hopefully, it will not be the last step.
Evictions and lack of repairs are often linked. Tenants, frustrated by the
unwillingness of some landlords to make repairs, stop paying rent and are
evicted. Landlords have no incentive to use the unlawful detainer statute if
in their county they can use a prosecutor to lever a tenant off the premises, if
309. See, e.g., Hennepin County, Minnesota’s form for a tenant’s petition for emergency
relief, http://www.mncourts.gov/default.aspx?page=513&item=295&itemType=formDetails
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
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the tenant is late with the rent or has stopped paying rent in protest. The
failure to vacate statute is enforced—or not—unevenly across the state with
respect to whether it can even be filed and what sanctions judges’ order.
Every day judges exceed their authority under the statute by ordering tenants
off of the rental premises. Judges also ignore mandatory provisions of the
statute, often in an attempt to try to fairly enforce a contradictory statute.
Landlords have legitimate criticisms of the unlawful detainer statute. It
should be amended to provide a quicker, less expensive procedure that landlords can file pro se, in district court, with the opportunity for appeal to circuit court. The Commission has recommended that once the civil eviction
statutes are reformed the failure to vacate statute should be repealed. Legal
reform of both the criminal eviction law and the duty to repair is long overdue and will produce a net benefit for the state of Arkansas and its citizens.
APPENDIX A
TREATMENT OF FAILURE TO VACATE CASES IN ARKANSAS COURTS
An “N/A” in the third column means that after repeated tries, researchers were unable to contact court personnel qualified to answer the questions.
Contacts were asked whether the district court handled failure to vacate cases. If the answer was yes, then they were asked approximately how many
per year. A “U” in the Yes/No column meant the respondent was unsure as
to the court’s jurisdiction, and no cases had been heard there in years. An
asterisked number is an actual number, either of affidavits filed in a year or
handled during a year. Contacts were asked whether there was a typical disposition. “D” means dismissed (typically if the tenant has moved out or in
the judge’s discretion); “N” means nolle prossed (again, typically the tenant
has moved out); “F” means fined. “V” with a number means the tenant is
given a certain number of days to vacate, usually without being fined. The
next three columns concern whether the penalties listed could ever be a possible outcome in that particular court. The “Jail, Ever” column answers the
question whether a tenant could ever be jailed as a sentence. Of course, tenants can be jailed for failure to appear or failure to pay a fine. Those situations are not covered by the question. Under the “Comments” column, “SC”
means landlords must sue in small claims court to recover rent owed. Courts
that do not hear FTV cases are highlighted. Some courts are listed “no” but
not highlighted because they refer their FTV cases to another court that does
hear them, or because they don’t have jurisdiction to hear FTV cases. “R” in
the “Comments” column indicates a response that FTV cases are referred to
another court. The citation “18-17-901” in the “Comments” column means it
was either clear or appeared from answers that the court was hearing “civil
eviction” cases.
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County

City/Town

Yes/
No

N/Year

Typical
Disposition

Fine

Arkansas

DeWitt
Gillett
St. Charles
Stuttgart

No
No
No
Yes

5

D or N

$25/day

Ashley

Crossett

Yes

12

D or F

$25/day

Hamburg

Yes

1 or 2

V or F

Briarcliff

No

Cotter

No

Gassville

No

Lakeview

No

Mountain
Home

Yes

<6

D

Norfork

No

Baxter

Benton

Boone
Bradley
Calhoun
Carroll

Chicot

Clark
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Back
Rent

Jail,
ever?

No
Yes, paid
from fines

No

$220

Yes

No

$25/day
discretionary

No

No

Yes
$175

Yes
No

No
No

Yes

No

No

Comments

SC

No
Ordered to
vacate, then
removed
R Mtn
Home
R Mtn
Home
R Mtn
Home
R Mtn
Home
Ordered to
vacate
R Mtn
Home
R Mtn
Home

Salesville

No

Bentonville
Bethel
Heights
Cave Springs
Centerton
Decatur
Gentry
Gravette
Little Flock
Lowell
Pea Ridge
Rogers
Siloam
Springs
Sulphur
Springs
Alpena
Harrison
Warren
Hampton
Berryville
Eureka
Springs
Green Forest
Dermott

No

No
Yes

<1

Eudora

Yes

1 or 2

F

Yes

Yes

No

Lake Village

Yes

1 or 2

F

$300

Yes

No

Amity

No

Arkadelphia

Yes

9*

D or F

$140

Yes

No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

1 or 2
6

F
D or N

No
SC
Must
appear even
if they have
moved out
R Arkadelphia
Court may
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Caddo Valley

Yes

Gurdon

Yes

Clay

Corning
Piggott
Rector

Yes
Yes
Yes

Cleburne

Concord

No

Greers Ferry

No

Heber Springs Yes

Cleveland
Columbia

Quitman

Yes

Rison
Magnolia
Waldo
Mennifee
Morrilton
Oppelo
Plummerville
Jonesboro
Lake City
Alma
Mountainberg
Mulberry
Van Buren
Earle
Gilmore
Jericho
Marion
Turrell

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No

W. Memphis

51
arrange to
garnish
tenant’s
wages,
assigning a
civil number at
criminal
hearing

D or F

Yes

Sometimes

Yes

D or F

$140

Yes

No

4
6

F
F

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

6

F

Per day

Sometimes

No

F

$215 plus
Not
$45 per day recently

9

No

<1

N

12

F

Yes

No

No

<1
35*
3

D or F
N

Per day
$205
$205

No
No
No

No
No
No

2

$195

No

No

4

$25/day

No

Rarely

Yes

71*

$25/day

Yes, post
if plead
NG

Not
recently

Cherry Valley
Parkin
Wynne
Fordyce
Sparkman
Dumas
McGehee

N/A
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

25
4 to 6

$265
Seldom

No
No

No
Possibly

Drew

Monticello

No

Faulkner

Conway
Damascus
Greenbrier
Guy

Yes
No
Yes
No

$150

Yes

$175

Yes

Conway

Craighead
Crawford

Crittenden

Cross

Dallas
Desha

D or F
D

1 or 2
4

D or F

No

Counted
with Arkadelphia

R Piggott
R Heber
Spgs
R Heber
Spgs
None lately
City failure
to vacate
ordinance

R Magnolia
R Morrilton
SC
R Morrilton

18-17-901
SC
R Marion
R elsewhere
SC
R elsewhere
If T pleads
guilty and
pays fine,
SC for rent

SC
SC
Seem to be
using 1817-901
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Mayflower
Mount
Vernon
Vilonia
Altus

No

Charleston

Yes
No

Grant

Ozark
Mammoth
Springs
Salem
Hot Springs
(city)
Hot Springs
(cty)
Sheridan

Greene

Marmaduke

No

Paragould

Franklin

Fulton
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N/A
No
No
<1

$350

Yes

Yes

No

Special
case, T
would not
leave
R Salem

Yes

20

D

Rarely

No

No

Yes

147*

N

Rarely

No

No

Yes

158*

N

Rarely

No

No

Yes

1 or 2

D or N

No

No

Yes

10

D or F

$25/day

No

SC, usually

Hempstead Hope
Hot Spring Donaldson
Malvern
Rockport
Howard
Nashville

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

30

D

No

Sometimes
No

SC
Seem to be
using 1817-901

7*

F and V

Flat fee

No

No

6

$250

No

Independence

Yes

18

$220

Sometimes

No
Yes,
suspendSC
ed if
vacate

Yes

1

Rarely

No

Garland

Izard
Jackson

Jefferson

Johnson

Lafayette

Lawrence

Lee

Batesville
Horseshoe
Bend
Melbourne
Diaz

D

No
No

Newport

Yes

Swifton
Tuckerman
Altheimer
Humphrey
Pine Bluff
Redfield
Wabbaseka
White Hall
Clarksville

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

10

Coal Hill

Yes

0

Lamar

Yes

3

Bradley

No

Lewisville

Yes

Stamps

No

Black Rock
Hoxie

Yes
Yes

Walnut Ridge

Yes

Marianna

Yes

Yes, in
one case
where T
would not
leave

<1

No

No

R Malvern
SC
R Malvern

SC
R Newport

No

SC
R Newport
Traffic only
18-17-901

3

2 (whole
county)
4

D or F

Traffic only

Yes
$145

No

No

F

$25/day

No

No

D or F
D or F

$250
$250

No
No

Yes
Yes

D or N

$250

No

Yes

$25/day

No

No

Would hear
if filed
R Lewisville
R Lewisville

SC
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Gould
Grady
Star City–city
and county

No
No
Yes

<5

D or F

$175 or
$25/day

Possible

No

SC

Ashdown

Yes

4 or 5

V=30

$230

No

No

Winthrop
Booneville

No
Yes

SC, ordered
to vacate

2 or 3

F

Yes

Yes

No

Magazine

No

Paris
Cabot
Carlisle

Yes
Yes
Yes

5 or 6
N/A
0 to 2

F
D
D

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

No
No

4

D

5 or 6
4 or 5

D

$205

No

Yes

N or F

$265 plus
$25/day

No

No

$25/day

No

No

England

Madison
Marion

Lonoke
Ward
Huntsville
Bull Shoals
Flippin
Yellville

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Miller

Texarkana

Yes

360

Mississippi

Blytheville

Yes

10

Monroe

Montgomery
Nevada
Newton
Ouachita

Perry
Phillips

53
R Star City
Traffic only

Dell

Yes

Gosnell

No

Leachville

Yes

0 to 2

N

Manila

Yes

2

V=30

No

No

No

Osceola

Yes

10

D or F

$25/day

No

No

Brinkley

No
3 or 4

D or F

$25/day

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Clarendon

Yes

Holly Grove

No

Mount Ida

Yes

3 or 4

D

Prescott
Jasper

Yes
No

6

V

Bearden

U

Camden

Yes

30

D

Chidester
East Camden
Stephens
Perryville
Elaine
Helena

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

<1

D

<1

D

60

F

No

$100/day,
suspended No
if T vacates

None since
2009

SC

SC
Hear
criminal
cases but
never an
FTV
R Blytheville
Moved to
Blytheville
if T doesn’t
vacate in
time
SC
18-17-901
is used
R Clarendon

Hear
criminal
cases but
never an
FTV
No

SC
Traffic only

Varies

No

No

R Helena
SC
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Lake View

N/A

Marvell

Yes

W. Helena

Yes

Glenwood

No

Murfreesboro

Yes

6

F and V

Harrisburg
Lepanto
Marked Tree
Truman
Tyronza

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

2
1
12
2
12

D or F
D
N
D or F

Weiner

Yes

0

Polk

Mena

Yes

12

Pope

Atkins
Dover

Yes
No

2

London

Yes

Pottsville

No

Russellville
Biscoe
Des Arc
Devalls Bluff
Hazen
Cammack

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

16*
1
1
6
3

D or F
D
D
D
D

Yes
No
No
$75/day
$25/day

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No
No

Jacksonville

Yes

41*

D or F

Yes

Sometimes

Yes

Little Rock

Yes

475*

V and D

No

No

No

Pike

Poinsett

Prairie

Pulaski

Randolph
Saline

Scott
Searcy
Sebastian

5

$5 to $50
per day

No

Yes

If asked
for

No

$25/day
$25/day

No
No
Maybe
No
No

No
No
Yes
No
No

N

No

No

No

D or F

Yes

Yes

No

F

Varies
$25/day

No

Little Rock-2

No

Little Rock-3

No

Maumelle

Yes

35-40

D

$225

No

No. Little
Rock-1

Sometimes

Yes

104*

D or F

$25/day

No

No

No. Little
Rock-2

No

Pulaski
County

Yes

22*

N

Rarely

No

No

Sherwood

Yes

14*

D

$200-300

No

Wrightsville
Pocahontas
Alexander
Bauxite
Benton
Bryant
Haskell
Shannon Hills
Waldron
Marshall
Barling

No
N/A
Yes
N/A
Yes
No
No
N/A
Yes
No
N/A

Sometimes

Counted
with Helena
R MurfreesMurfreesboro
Ordered to
vacate,
sheriff may
enforce
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
Have not
handled any
Must post
bond if
plead NG

R Russellville
R Russellville

SC
SC
SC
Traffic only
Ordered to
vacate
Traffic only
Environmental only
Ordered to
vacate
Traffic and
environmental only

Traffic only

10

D or F

Yes

No

No

2

D

No

No

No

15

F

Yes

Yes

No

R Benton
R Benton
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Central City
No
Fort Smith–all
Yes
depts

27*

55

D or F

$25/day

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Greenwood

Yes

24

D

$25/day,
discretionary

Sevier

DeQueen

Yes

3 or 4

F and V

Yes

Sharp

Ash Flat

No

Cherokee
Village

No

Stone

Mountain
View

Yes

<1

N

$145, only
if T doesn’t No
leave

No

St. Francis

Forrest City

Yes

30 to 40

F

$240

No

Madison

No

Union
El Dorado
Van Buren Clinton
WashingElkins
ton

White

Woodruff

No
No

Ordered to
vacate
Use 18-17901

SC, most of
the time
R Forrest
City
18-17-901

No

SC

Elm Springs

Yes

Farmington
Fayetteville
Greenland
Johnson
Lincoln
Prairie Grove

No
Yes
No
No
No
No

No cases
for last few
years

Springdale

Yes

West Fork
Bald Knob
Beebe
Bradford
Judsonia
Kensett
McRae
Pangburn
Rosebud
Searcy

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Augusta

Yes

Cotton Plant

Yes

McCrory

Yell

Rarely

SC

Yes

Patterson

Yes

Dardanelleboth districts

Yes

1 or 2

F

$100

No

No

SC
SC

100

D, F

1 to 3

D, F

Yes

12*

D, F

Yes

24

F

12

6

D or F

N or F

$200

$25/day,
discretionary

SC

Yes, if
ordered

No

Yes

No

Sometimes

No

No

R Searcy
R Searcy
R Searcy
R Searcy
R Searcy
R Searcy

No
Counted
under
Augusta
No

SC
Counted
under
Augusta

Sometimes

No
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APPENDIX B
FAILURE TO VACATE DEFENDANTS BY RACE AND SEX
Race and Sex
Asian or Pacific Is.
Females
Asian or Pacific Is.
Males
Black Females
Black Males
Hispanic Females
Hispanic Males
Marshallese Females
Marshallese Males
White Females
White Males
N/A Females
N/A Males
Total
Total Percent Female

Little Rock

Springdale

1 (.3%)

4 (3%)

0

1 (1%)

248 (63%)
96 (24%)
2 (.5%)
2 (.5%)
0
0
30 (8%)
17 (4%)
0
0
396
72%

7 (6%)
5 (4%)
3 (3%)
5 (4%)
6 (5%)
6 (5%)
36 (31%)
25 (22%)
11 (9%)
7 (6%)
116
57%

